On 18 November 2013 22:41, Telmo Menezes <[email protected]> wrote:

> On Mon, Nov 18, 2013 at 1:02 AM, LizR <[email protected]> wrote:
> > This is quite simple. Markets ignore the commons, hence a free market
> > solution can't - or is highly unlikely - to work.
>
> Yes, but this is circular. You're saying that the market cannot work
> for things that you do not allow to be part of the market. The
> government has to exist, otherwise how is the government to exist?
>

It isn't part of the market because no one wants it to be, not because no
one allows it to be.

>
> > No one is going to clean
> > up the commons, just as they didn't in medieval villages, because there
> is
> > no incentive for an individual, or a specific group, to do so.
>
> The medieval times were not exactly a period of free market, so this
> would be an example on how government can solve things... or not. In
> reality, many of the things we learned in high school about medieval
> times are myths or gross simplifications
>

Not the tragedy of the commons, however. But even if it was the logic would
hold.

>
> > The tragedy
> > of the commons is one reason to have governments, because everyone wants
> > something done that no one will do "off their own bat" - but they are
> > prepared to chip in a donation towards the government doing it, or
> > organising somone else to do it.
>
> If they are prepared to chip in a donation there is no problem. If
> there is money to be made, the free market will be glad to oblige. You
> don't seem prepared to call things by its names: the idea of
> government is that, when people are not prepared to chip in, they are
> forced to do so, ultimately by violent means. The paradox here is that
> you are trusting a small group of people with this coercive power and
> then expecting this small group and power asymmetry to result in more
> altruism.
>
> Again, reality is complex. Current forms of democracy would not work
> if implemented in previous cultures, because people would not accept
> the social norms that come with them. You cannot police everything or
> even 1% of what's going on. Systems work because they become stable.
> This stability does not come from consent (I was born into this system
> and never consented to it, neither did you). It comes from the
> emergence of sets of incentives. I disagree with many laws that I'm
> not going to break because the personal cost to me would be too great.
> Suppose I decide I don't trust the government with my tax money, so I
> decide to take it instead and give it directly to organisations that I
> deem worthy: hospitals, schools, research centres and so on. I would
> end up in jail for "chipping in". In fact government robs me of my
> freedom to chip in, because they take all of my "chip in" money and
> then some, and then give it to banks.
>
> Incentives also emerge from free markets, importantly the incentive to
> be nice to the people you trade with. Where there are more trade
> routes there are less wars. If you are polluting the air I breath you
> are being hostile towards me, and I am less likely to want to enter a
> transaction with you. But these delicate balances can't arise under
> coercion and market distortion.
>
> > And if no one does it, we all end up worse
> > off (perhaps fatally so in this case). It ain't rocket science, although
> > game theory has something to say about it.
>
> Prisoner dilemma scenarios don't magically disappear once you
> introduce coercion. In fact, I argue that they multiply.
>

You seem to be arguing against a straw man here.  I explained why the free
market can't fix the tragedy of the commons. You haven't answered my point.

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