On 20 Nov 2013, at 21:57, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
To say that F = m . a or e= m c2 as truth it is necessary to
accept certain beliefs. Belief that at the next moment the laws will
not change for example.
e=mc^2 is an interesting theory (belief), or an interesting theorem in
an interesting theory. True. Perhaps, but that's a question for
theologian, not physicists.
Let´s go to a human level:
in evolutionary terms, I would say that truth is a belief hardcoded
by natural selection.
This is self-defeating or circular. You need the "truth" of natural
selection to make sense of it.
Truth would say, is the constants plus the algorthm,
OK. But that's equivalent with saying that we accept elementary
arithmetic as true, and then proceed from there. With comp, we cannot
take more axioms.
The data that the living being processes, are the beliefs.
OK.
The pivotal affirmation from Conrad Lorenz: "The kantian a priori
where shaped in our mind as a result of natural selection"
This presupposed some theory, implicitly as being true.
has a very far reaching: it means that self evident truths like the
existence of persons, animals, space, time and all self evident
truths that derives from them are hardcoded, and we have hardcoded
algorithms for processing them. That is the reason why they appear
behind us and we react to them without any doubt about their
existence. We also have also algoritm for adquiring derived concepts
in certain ways and not in others.
OK. But all this depends on your fundamental theory. What is "natural
selection" when you have no time, no space, no persons, etc. What are
your starting assumptions?
Truth in a ample sense is whatever that kick-back: a stone wall for
example.
OK. I like to see truth as a queen which win all wars without any army
(but that can take times!).
But that is not all. in evolutionary terms, the kick-back can happen
across generations. If we doubt about certain abstract truths (like
to kill is bad),
That's not a truth. It is a normative imperative. (A good one imo).
we will not receive an inmediate negative feedback, but perhaps in a
few years or even our gene/meme descendants. That is why the
Lorenz`s mechanism has included in our mind a lot of innate common
sense truths).
That materialist explanation paradoxically end up in the idea that
there is no space neither time neither persons outside the world of
the mind, that is what really exist. Out of the mind there is
nothing. Perhaps mathematics.
With comp we can't really use more than arithmetic for the ontology,
and we need full higher order mathematics for anything inside
arithmetic seen from arithmetic. Arithmetic seen from inside is much
bigger than arithmetic (cf the Skolem phenomenon).
I´m in aggreement with Craig on this.
I don't see this. Craig assumes some primitive matter, and attribute
mind to it. You seem more to be in agreement with comp than with
Craig, it seems to me.
Bruno
2013/6/3 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
On 03 Jun 2013, at 01:41, Stephen Paul King wrote:
How do we integrate empirical data into Bp&p?
Technically, by restricting p to the "leaves of the UD*" (the true,
and thus provable, sigma_1 sentences).
Then to get the physics (the probability measure à-la-UDA), you can
do the same with Bp & Dp & p. Think about the WM-duplication, where
the W or M selection plays the role of a typical empirical data.
More on this when you came back to this, probably on FOAR.
Bruno
On Saturday, June 1, 2013 3:41:56 PM UTC-4, JohnM wrote:
Russell wrote:
"...When it comes to Bp & p capturing the notion of knowledge, I
can see it captures the notion of mathematical knowledge, ie true
theorems, as opposed to true conjectures, say, which aren't
knowledge.
But I am vaguely sceptical it captures the notion of scientific
knowledge, which has more to do with falsifiability, than with proof.
And that's about where I left it - years ago.
..."
Interesting difference between 'scientific' and 'mathematical'
(see the Nobel Prize distinction) - also in falsifiability, that
does not automatically escape the agnostic questioning about the
circumstances of the falsifying and the original images. Same
difficulty as in judging "proof".
"Scientific knowledge" indeed is part of a belief system. In
conventional sciences we THINK we know, in math we assume
(apologies, Bruno).
John M
On Thu, May 30, 2013 at 6:43 PM, Russell Standish
<li...@hpcoders.com.au> wrote:
On Thu, May 30, 2013 at 12:04:13PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
> You mean unprovable? I get confused because it seems that you
> sometimes use Bp to mean "proves p" and sometimes "believes p"
>
To a mathematician, belief and proof are the same thing. I believe in
this theorem because I can prove it. If I can't prove it, then I
don't
believe it - it is merely a conjecture.
In modal logic, the operator B captures both proof and supposedly
belief. Obviously it captures a mathematician's notion of belief -
whether that extends to a scientists notion of belief, or a
Christian's notion is another matter entirely.
When it comes to Bp & p capturing the notion of knowledge, I can see
it captures the notion of mathematical knowledge, ie true theorems,
as
opposed to true conjectures, say, which aren't knowledge.
But I am vaguely sceptical it captures the notion of scientific
knowledge, which has more to do with falsifiability, than with proof.
And that's about where I left it - years ago.
Cheers
--
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Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpc...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au
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