On 21 Nov 2013, at 11:29, Alberto G. Corona wrote:




2013/11/21 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>

On 20 Nov 2013, at 21:57, Alberto G. Corona wrote:

To say that F = m . a or e= m c2 as truth it is necessary to accept certain beliefs. Belief that at the next moment the laws will not change for example.

e=mc^2 is an interesting theory (belief), or an interesting theorem in an interesting theory. True. Perhaps, but that's a question for theologian, not physicists.




Let´s go to a human level:

in evolutionary terms, I would say that truth is a belief hardcoded by natural selection.

This is self-defeating or circular. You need the "truth" of natural selection to make sense of it.


It do not try to define truth beyond the psychological truth.


OK. I heard you. But it is almost the difference between reality and dream, or between the first hypostase (God, truth, the real, the One, ..), and the first person (the soul, the subjective, etc.).



However, the psychological truths are the self evident truths, that are the true absolute truths. You want a pure mathematical or logical notion of absolute truth, which is impossible.

I don't want it, but here computationalism simplifies the picture a lot. Despite this, the "absolute" truth remains non definable, non expressible, and ply the role of the God that you cannot name.



natural selection is like e= mc2 . it explain things, but has implicit beliefs,

In the fundamental science, there is a point where we have to make all the beliefs explicit.




but expand the categories of problems and the deep of them that we can think of, create new hypothesis and test them. The Konrad Lorenz theory about the Kantian a prioris is one of them.

I have no problem with Kant.




Truth would say, is the constants plus the algorthm,

OK. But that's equivalent with saying that we accept elementary arithmetic as true, and then proceed from there. With comp, we cannot take more axioms.

It is not the same IMHO. To Accept as truth the constants and the algorithm of a being actually living (like humans), which implies heavy constraints imposed by the environment (for example moral rules as a result of almost a infinite sucession of games of life and death in society) than the wider affirmation that elementary aritmetic is true.

Wider?



"Aritmetic theory is true" is not a self evident truth.

my own consciousness here and now is the only self-evident truth. All the rest are theories. Now far more people will find 2+2=4 more self- evident than "thou shall not kill".



"to kill your neighbour is bad" is a "constant" or part of an "algoritm" for the navigation in the social environment.

It can be a law, but we depart from the fundamental inquiry. We might talk on different things.



It has psychological meaning of "truth" at the psychological level. and therefore is true in the sense that humans use the word true.

But that cannot be used to do science.








The data that the living being processes, are the beliefs.

OK.




The pivotal affirmation from Conrad Lorenz: "The kantian a priori where shaped in our mind as a result of natural selection"

This presupposed some theory, implicitly as being true.



has a very far reaching: it means that self evident truths like the existence of persons, animals, space, time and all self evident truths that derives from them are hardcoded, and we have hardcoded algorithms for processing them. That is the reason why they appear behind us and we react to them without any doubt about their existence. We also have also algoritm for adquiring derived concepts in certain ways and not in others.

OK. But all this depends on your fundamental theory. What is "natural selection" when you have no time, no space, no persons, etc. What are your starting assumptions?

Natural selection then becomes a non-process in a block universe defined by a mathematical equation which contains Self aware structures. As Tegmark defines them.

Tegmark use some identity thesis which is incoherent with comp. I think.
To put it shortly: I don't believe in a physical universe. The physical reality is a sharable dream by numbers.





NS is perceived psychologically as a law of the spacetime. A law at the macro level which operate at very large scales, but not very different that any law with space and time embedded in it, like s= v . t . But this is just the way we perceive them.

OK.







Truth in a ample sense is whatever that kick-back: a stone wall for example.

OK. I like to see truth as a queen which win all wars without any army (but that can take times!).



But that is not all. in evolutionary terms, the kick-back can happen across generations. If we doubt about certain abstract truths (like to kill is bad),

That's not a truth. It is a normative imperative. (A good one imo).

In terms of psychological self evident truths, it is absolute, since there is no higher truth in the world of the mind, by definition, but self evident , psychological truths.

Only consciousness is self-evident. "To kill is bad" is not precise enough to get a truth value. "Even killing a human" can be good for a lot of reason (self-defense, for example).




What kiked-back across generations was incorporated in our algoritms as self evident truths of the reality. By means of? by the evolution of the genetic program that develop our brains. that is what Konrad Lorenz said.

I agree in part, but again, this is about living in society, not attempting to understand the big picture (which I think is theological).





we will not receive an inmediate negative feedback, but perhaps in a few years or even our gene/meme descendants. That is why the Lorenz`s mechanism has included in our mind a lot of innate common sense truths).

That materialist explanation paradoxically end up in the idea that there is no space neither time neither persons outside the world of the mind, that is what really exist. Out of the mind there is nothing. Perhaps mathematics.

With comp we can't really use more than arithmetic for the ontology, and we need full higher order mathematics for anything inside arithmetic seen from arithmetic. Arithmetic seen from inside is much bigger than arithmetic (cf the Skolem phenomenon).


But as i said before, there is no pure mathematical notion of truth that can model what humans take for truth.

Nor even what machines can take for truth.




Only the world of the mind has truths.


In your sense of psychological truth? OK.
But fundamental science needs a notion of truth being independent of humans, machines, observers, etc.



To do so you have to leap from math and talk about dreams, that is, indeed, the proposition of wold of the mind, a second reality emerging right from the world of the numbers. But I do not see this emergence, neither I see the emergence of minds or souls from whatever complicated algorithms. That demand a leap of faith and this faith is not mine. I don´t buy this extension of observed correlations to causalities.

Are you saying that you don't believe in comp?

The truth of comp is another topic, which I prefer to avoid.

Also, if you buy a non-comp theory, you should state it. Get theorems, and show how to test them.





By the way, If for KL the kantian a prioris of the human mind are shaped by evolution, what is the nature of the things-in-themselves? what are the things before being perceived and processed by the mind?.

But this will depend on your theory. What is your theory? What are your assumptions?




According with Kant, the knowledge of the things-in-themselves is impossible.

In which theory? With comp, that is possible, up to a recursive equivalence. The thing in themselves are 0 and its successors.




I propose that they are nothing but the mathematics of the block universe.

But which universe? I don't believe in "universe". I have never found any evidence, nor anything explained by that hypothesis.




it may be homomorphic to some computation or part of a computation (i don´t like the computation idea because it implies time. and computation can be reduced to a timeless transformation using category theory)

Computation needs only the notion of successor. You need a cartesian close category with a natural number object. It is far simpler to just agree on the usual simple axioms of arithmetic (which is far less demanding than category theory).




And there may be other realities behind, we don´t know.

In science we know nothing as such. WE can only agree on some theory, work with it, and confront it with the facts.






 I´m in aggreement with Craig on this.

I don't see this. Craig assumes some primitive matter, and attribute mind to it. You seem more to be in agreement with comp than with Craig, it seems to me.

Bruno


I´m more idealist. I believe in an autonomous world of the mind that is the REAL world that we inhabit by definition.

So you assume mind. This does not satify me, as I look for an explanation of mind and matter from things which are conceptually simpler, like numbers or combinators.



The material phenomena are events in the mind.

That is partially true in the comp theory. But mind and matter emerges from the existence of absence of solution(s) to Diophantine equation, or even to just one of them(*).



All that we see is in the mind that is evident.

That we see something is self-evident, but what we see is not.





The coherence between phenomena in different minds and the laws of nature may be a result of a process of selection in which the minds select their substrate. In the same way than the definition of existence of a mathematical structure is the existence of Self Aware Structures that contemplate it from within.

But how will you define and work on self-aware structure without some math and realism.




I admit a certain dualism mind-math here that need a kind of Roger- Lebnizian pre-existing harmony and a creator Mind.

No problem with this. That is offered freely by arithmetic, if we assume computationalism. You should love comp, but apparently it looks you do have some problem with it. I am not sure to understand why.

Bruno






2013/6/3 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>

On 03 Jun 2013, at 01:41, Stephen Paul King wrote:

How do we integrate empirical data into Bp&p?



Technically, by restricting p to the "leaves of the UD*" (the true, and thus provable, sigma_1 sentences). Then to get the physics (the probability measure à-la-UDA), you can do the same with Bp & Dp & p. Think about the WM-duplication, where the W or M selection plays the role of a typical empirical data.

More on this when you came back to this, probably on FOAR.

Bruno







On Saturday, June 1, 2013 3:41:56 PM UTC-4, JohnM wrote:
Russell wrote:
"...When it comes to Bp & p capturing the notion of knowledge, I can see it captures the notion of mathematical knowledge, ie true theorems, as opposed to true conjectures, say, which aren't knowledge. But I am vaguely sceptical it captures the notion of scientific knowledge, which has more to do with falsifiability, than with proof.
And that's about where I left it - years ago.
..."
Interesting difference between 'scientific' and 'mathematical'
(see the Nobel Prize distinction) - also in falsifiability, that does not automatically escape the agnostic questioning about the circumstances of the falsifying and the original images. Same difficulty as in judging "proof". "Scientific knowledge" indeed is part of a belief system. In conventional sciences we THINK we know, in math we assume
(apologies, Bruno).
John M


On Thu, May 30, 2013 at 6:43 PM, Russell Standish <li...@hpcoders.com.au> wrote:
On Thu, May 30, 2013 at 12:04:13PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
> You mean unprovable?  I get confused because it seems that you
> sometimes use Bp to mean "proves p" and sometimes "believes p"
>

To a mathematician, belief and proof are the same thing. I believe in this theorem because I can prove it. If I can't prove it, then I don't
believe it - it is merely a conjecture.

In modal logic, the operator B captures both proof and supposedly
belief. Obviously it captures a mathematician's notion of belief -
whether that extends to a scientists notion of belief, or a
Christian's notion is another matter entirely.

When it comes to Bp & p capturing the notion of knowledge, I can see
it captures the notion of mathematical knowledge, ie true theorems, as
opposed to true conjectures, say, which aren't knowledge.

But I am vaguely sceptical it captures the notion of scientific
knowledge, which has more to do with falsifiability, than with proof.

And that's about where I left it - years ago.

Cheers

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