On 09 Dec 2013, at 20:02, meekerdb wrote:

On 12/9/2013 1:35 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 08 Dec 2013, at 22:53, Telmo Menezes wrote:

On Sun, Dec 8, 2013 at 6:59 PM, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> wrote:
Telmo Menezes

you must also reject the MWI, because you live


Who is "you"? Telmo's post was only 63 words long but the pronoun "you" was used 8 times, that's almost 13%. When it is necessary to hide behind personal pronouns when a philosophical idea regarding duplicating machines and personal identity is discussed it's clear that something is wrong.

in the first person,


Which first person? The first person of John Clark of one hour ago? The first person of John Clark standing left of the duplicating machine? The first person of John Clark standing right of the duplicating machine?

You're avoiding my question. Why don't you also reject the MWI?


I would like to know that too. Quentin has already asked this many times to John, and we got unclear answer.

John invoked the fact that with comp the duplication are done only in one branch of the universe, but did not explain why would that change anything (without adding some non Turing emulable magic in some place).

I think Quentin is right, and John C. just develop irrational rhetoric do avoid moving on in the argument, ... then he talk like if I was defining comp by its consequences, but this is another rhetorical trick, often used by those who want to mock the enterprise.

It is interesting. I try to figure out what is really stucking him so much. i do the same with my students in math. Why some people avoid reason in some circumstance. Given that Quentin seems to qualify himself as atheist, it can't be simply Clark's atheism, isn't it? But then what?

I think the sticking point, one which I also feel with some force, is the implicit assumption in the question, "Where will you find yourself." that there is a unique "you".

Do you agree that in Helsinki we have:

Probability("I will feel to be a unique guy in an unique city") = 1 (assuming comp and all the default assumptions) ?







Under the theory of souls it would make sense to ask, which duplicate will your soul go to. But under computationalism there is no answer be the duplication entails that there is no "you", there are only computations that "think" you.

The question is on that thinking. If you answer "yes" to the question above, and so Probability("I will feel to be a unique guy in an unique city") = 1, you know in advance that you will feel/think to be unique in all possible future situations brought by the duplication. Given that both copies are produced, you know that both feels unique in one city. So both will get one bit of information, when looking where they feel to be, and that is another way to describe the first person indeterrminacy.

Your point according to which that it is like there was a soul confirms my identification of the soul with the first person, and that fits nicely with theTheatetus' definition of the knower and Plotinus' definition of the soul (according to me, and Bréhier).

Bruno





Brent

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