On 12/10/2013 12:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Do you agree that in Helsinki we have:
Probability("I will feel to be a unique guy in an unique city") = 1 (assuming comp and
all the default assumptions) ?
It has the same problem. It is just moved from "you" to "I". What does "I" refer to. I
can say "There will be a guy who finds hiself in a city."...but is it "I"?
Under the theory of souls it would make sense to ask, which duplicate will your soul go
to. But under computationalism there is no answer be the duplication entails that there
is no "you", there are only computations that "think" you.
The question is on that thinking. If you answer "yes" to the question above, and so
Probability("I will feel to be a unique guy in an unique city") = 1, you know in advance
that you will feel/think to be unique in all possible future situations brought by the
duplication. Given that both copies are produced, you know that both feels unique in one
city.
So both will get one bit of information, when looking where they feel to be, and that is
another way to describe the first person indeterrminacy.
Your point according to which that it is like there was a soul confirms my
identification of the soul with the first person, and that fits nicely with
theTheatetus' definition of the knower and Plotinus' definition of the soul (according
to me, and Bréhier).
Except that souls were, by definition, unique and could not be duplicated (like quantum
states).
Brent
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