On 10 Dec 2013, at 20:03, meekerdb wrote:

On 12/10/2013 12:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Do you agree that in Helsinki we have:

Probability("I will feel to be a unique guy in an unique city") = 1 (assuming comp and all the default assumptions) ?


It has the same problem.  It is just moved from "you" to "I".

Oh, I could have use "you" instead of "I". My choice here was random.



What does "I" refer to.

To my future first person experience.




I can say "There will be a guy who finds hiself in a city."...but is it "I"?


It will be, from his point of view, as much "I" than in a simple digital brain substitution.



Under the theory of souls it would make sense to ask, which duplicate will your soul go to. But under computationalism there is no answer be the duplication entails that there is no "you", there are only computations that "think" you.

The question is on that thinking. If you answer "yes" to the question above, and so Probability("I will feel to be a unique guy in an unique city") = 1, you know in advance that you will feel/ think to be unique in all possible future situations brought by the duplication. Given that both copies are produced, you know that both feels unique in one city. So both will get one bit of information, when looking where they feel to be, and that is another way to describe the first person indeterrminacy.

Your point according to which that it is like there was a soul confirms my identification of the soul with the first person, and that fits nicely with theTheatetus' definition of the knower and Plotinus' definition of the soul (according to me, and Bréhier).

Except that souls were, by definition, unique and could not be duplicated (like quantum states).

And like comp states below our substitution level, and like souls in comp, from their points of view. Comp makes it impossible to duplicate a soul, from a soul point of view. You remains unique, from your point of view. the "observer" cannot be aware of the split, by its first person experience only. It needs 3p clues.

Bruno



Brent

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