On 11 Dec 2013, at 17:19, John Clark wrote:

On Wed, Dec 11, 2013 at 3:49 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

> Then you can't say that you will survive anything. We die at each instant

OK, but then you can't say that survival is important, or that the word means much of anything at all.

That was my point. Indeed. Comp would lost his meaning. We can say yes and no to the doctor, as we die anyway in the next second.
But of course this is non sense.

> and comp is made trivial,

'Comp" is not trivial, "comp" is a gibberish word made up by you that is almost as meaningless as "free will".

Comp is the mechanist thesis. You confuse axioms and theorems. You might disagree with the theorem, but then you need to start from comp, (step 0) and find a flaw. I insist, your preceding argument was shown to confuse the 1-view and the 3-view on the 1-view, quite precisely. You have never answer that confusion.

>> you can only trace identity from the past to the present. A feeling of self has nothing to do with predictions,

> That's the point.

If that's the point then why do you keep emphasizing what the various copies will predict about their future and how accurate those predictions turn out to be?

The point is that we need only a notion of first person self, and thrid person self, which in UDA are well defined through the diaries, and in the math part, the 3-self is given by the diagoal method (Dx = "xx"), and the 1-self by applying the Theatetus denition of the knower. But we don't need to solve the "personal identity" problem. Only local bodies (3-self) and personal memories (1-self) are used in the proof/argument.

>> If tomorrow somebody remembers being Telmo Menezes today then Telmo Menezes has a future, if not then Telmo Menezes has no future, and Quantum Mechanics or a understanding of Everett's Many Worlds is not needed for any of it. Period. However in a completely different unrelated matter, if you want to assign a probability that tomorrow a observer that can be interviewed by a third party will observe a electron move left or right then Quantum Mechanics will be needed. And some (including me) feel that Everett's interpretation is a convenient way to think about it, although there are other ways.

> Not in comp

Perhaps not but I honestly don't give a damn about "comp".

You said that you believe in comp. You disbelieve only in the consequence, but you don't have provided a correction to your refutation of the derivation of that consequence, which has shown to be flawed (not just by me).

If you don't give a damn about the consequence of comp, stay mute about them. If you think there is a flaw in a proof, it is up to you to find it, but without changing the definition, and by taking into account the 1/3 nuances, which are of course crucial to get the 1- indeterminacy provided by self-multiplication.

If you think there is no 1-indeterminacy, please give the algorithm of prediction, or an argument that such an algorithm could exist.



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