On Fri, Dec 13, 2013 at 5:22 PM, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Thu, Dec 12, 2013 at 4:45 PM, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com> wrote: > > > Any time John Clark pretends that he does not understand or believe in >> first-person indeterminancy, >> > > But I do believe in and understand first-person indeterminacy, in fact it > was without question the very first thing that I ever understood in my > life; even as a infant I realized that I didn't know what I would see next, > and even if I did I didn't know what I would do next. > > >refer him to his own post where he admitts to understanding it and >> believing in it: >> >> https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/5PR1FXp_CSU/PnuTSn_82PwJ >> >> > John Clark: "So yes, subjectively the intelligence would have no way of >> knowing if A was true or B, or to put it another way subjectively it would >> make no difference." >> > > I stand by every word I wrote, especially "subjectively it would make no > difference"; but if you're going to quote me quote the entire paragraph: > > " Both A and B are identical in that the intelligence doesn't know what it > is going to see next; but increasingly convoluted thought experiments are > not needed to demonstrate that everyday fact. The only difference is that > in A lots of copies are made of the intelligence and in B they are not; but > as the intelligence would have no way of knowing if a copy had been made of > itself or not nor would it have any way of knowing if it was the original > or the copy, subjectively it doesn't matter if A or B is true. > > So yes, subjectively the intelligence would have no way of knowing if A > was true or B, or to put it another way subjectively it would make no > difference." > > And I concluded that post with: > > "the conclusion is the same, and that is the not very profound conclusion > that you never know what you're going to see next, and Bruno's grand > discovery of First Person Indeterminacy is just regular old dull as > dishwater indeterminacy first discovered by Og the caveman. After the big > buildup it's a bit of a letdown actually." > > The thought experiment and conclusion also bears on the question of identity, in that a possibility, that Bruno, John, and Og are just some UD distributed, locally and subjectively disconnected instantiations of the same person, instead of different boxes made of bone sitting on their individual physical shoulders, is given. This possibility could help explain why John remains crude, impolite, intolerant and repeats himself again and again; like Og trying to square a circle and why Bruno would keep trying to help Og see that that's impossible. But Og is obsessed by squared circles (e.g. Head = Box) and will not let go... which is why the Bruno John-Og discussion looks like it would never halt... but since we can't be sure, Og can keep taking advantage. Og can keep trolling, which is what others on this list have repeatedly pointed out, because the possibility that he raises a new, and interesting point is real. But after 3 years of reading this, I'm starting to think lottery is a better idea. Indeed Og, this is trivial: so stop or make a point once every few years. PGC John K Clark > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to email@example.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.