On 12/10/2013 9:03 AM, John Clark wrote:
On Sun, Dec 8, 2013 Telmo Menezes <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
> You're avoiding my question. Why don't you also reject the MWI?
If I am reluctant to answer your question it is because I've already done so many times
in the past, but if you insist I will do so again. The Many World's Interpretation is
about what can be expected to be seen, and although it may seem strange to us Everett's
ideas are 100% logically self consistent. Bruno's "proof" is not about what will be seen
but about a feeling of identity, about who you can expect to be; but you do not think
you're the same person you were yesterday because yesterday you made a prediction about
today that turned out to be correct, you think you're the same person you were
yesterday for one reason and one reason only, you remember being Telmo Menezes
yesterday. It's a good thing that's the way it works because I make incorrect
predictions all the time and when I do I don't feel that I've entered oblivion, instead
I feel like I am the same person I was before because I can still remember being the guy
who made that prediction that turned out to be wrong. I don't feel like I'm dead, I just
feel like the guy who made a crappy prediction.
Sure, but if you were repeatedly wrong about Washington and Moscow in a way consistent
with Bernoulli trials, wouldn't you begin to think "Where I'm going to end up next time I
do this teleportation thing is random with Prob(W)=Prob(M)=0.5."?
Brent
Bruno thinks you can trace personal identity from the present to the future, but that is
like pushing on a string. You can only pull a string and you can only trace identity
from the past to the present. A feeling of self has nothing to do with predictions,
successful ones or otherwise, and in fact you might not even have a future, but you
certainly have a past.
If tomorrow somebody remembers being Telmo Menezes today then Telmo Menezes has a
future, if not then Telmo Menezes
has no future, and Quantum Mechanics or a understanding of Everett's Many Worlds is not
needed for any of it. Period. However in a completely different unrelated matter, if you
want to assign a probability that tomorrow a observer that can be interviewed by a third
party will observe a electron move left or right then Quantum Mechanics will be needed.
And some (including me) feel that Everett's interpretation is a convenient way to think
about it, although there are other ways.
John K Clark
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