On 12/16/2013 2:27 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Mon, Dec 16, 2013 at 3:14 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net
On 12/16/2013 12:40 PM, LizR wrote:
On 17 December 2013 08:06, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net
JKC makes a big point of the complete separation of quantum worlds,
Everett didn't write about multiple worlds. Everett only considered
and wrote about the "relative state" of the observer and the observed system.
In some ways this is more fundamental because in principle the "different
worlds" of MWI can interfere with one another. That they usually don't
("Many worlds" is just a nice (and roughly accurate) description, like Big
(better than Small Hiss) or Black Hole (better than Very Faintly Glowing
Infinite Gravity :)
I think that's an unfair criticism of Copenhagen. Deterministic
push the problem back in time. Ultimately there is either an uncaused
an infinite past. So there is not great intellectual virtue in
uncaused events. Quantum mechanics is an interesting intermediate case.
randomness, but randomness that is strictly limited and limited in such
that it produces the classical world at a statistical level.
The problem is pushed back onto whatever is considered fundamental. If
there is an
original event, it is only uncaused if it doesn't emerge naturally from (for
example) the equations that are believed to describe the universe. One can
same about an infinite past.
Your own theory also introduces uncaused events, namely the
computations of a
universal dovetailer. The whole idea of "everythingism" was inspired by
QM itself doesn't entail that everything happens. If you measure a
only get eigenvalues of that variable - not every possible value. If
measure it again you get the same eigenvalue again - not any value.
I was given to believe that the computations of the UD aren't events, and
simply exist within arithmetic as a logically necessary consequence of its
existence. Did I get that wrong?
I wouldn't say "wrong". It depends on whether you think "There exists a
of 2." implies that 3 exists. Personally I think it is a confusion to say
logical formula is satisfied by X is the same as saying X exists in the
On the contrary, self-duplication explains the appearance of such
indeterminacy, without adding any further assumptions.
Well, the existence of self-duplication, even via Everett, is a further
Surely the existence of duplication (rather than self-duplication) arises
equations? So one has self-duplication as a consequence, to the same extent
one has it within ones own personal past? Or have I misunderstood that too?
(Or are you just talking about the sort of assumptions we have to make all
Occam favors it. Your belief in "3)" substitutes a very simple
a call to a form of built-in-non-explainable magic.
No more magic than a UD.
Why is the UD magic? (Is arithmetic magic?)
It's hypothetically generating all possible worlds, but where is it? It's
Platonia. It's "the word made flesh." Sounds a lot more magical than
decayed by potential tunneling just like the equations say."
In a sense, one can be more certain about arithmetical reality than the physical
reality. An evil demon could be responsible for our belief in atoms, and stars, and
photons, etc., but it is may be impossible for that same demon to give us the experience
of factoring 7 in to two integers besides 1 and 7.
But that's because we made up 1 and 7 and the defintion of factoring. Their our language
and that's why we have control of them.
So while Descartes could doubt physical reality, he could not doubt the "unreality
of arithmetically impossible experiences".
I don't think Descartes could doubt physical reality. Even Bruno rejects solipism and
that's just doubting the reality of other people. I find it pretty easy to doubt that you
can always add one more to an integer. I think 10^10^10 + 1 may well equal 10^10^10 in
In that sense, arithmetic would in-part control possible experiences, and is harder to
doubt than the possibility that physics is constrains experiences. Indeed,
computationalism suggests this is true. An appropriately programmed computer can
generate any experience that can be possibly experienced in any universe: our own "laws
of physics" do not constrain our possible experience whatsoever,
?? They seem to constrain my experience of breathing under water and flying to
so long as a Turing machine can be built within the laws of some physical
I know. That's your story and you're sticking to it.
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