On 12/16/2013 2:27 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Mon, Dec 16, 2013 at 3:14 PM, meekerdb <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:On 12/16/2013 12:40 PM, LizR wrote:On 17 December 2013 08:06, meekerdb <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: JKC makes a big point of the complete separation of quantum worlds, although Everett didn't write about multiple worlds. Everett only considered one worldand wrote about the "relative state" of the observer and the observed system. In some ways this is more fundamental because in principle the "differentworlds" of MWI can interfere with one another. That they usually don't is a statistical result. ("Many worlds" is just a nice (and roughly accurate) description, like Big Bang (better than Small Hiss) or Black Hole (better than Very Faintly Glowing Region of Infinite Gravity :) I think that's an unfair criticism of Copenhagen. Deterministic theories just push the problem back in time. Ultimately there is either an uncaused event or an infinite past. So there is not great intellectual virtue in rejecting uncaused events. Quantum mechanics is an interesting intermediate case. It has randomness, but randomness that is strictly limited and limited in such a way that it produces the classical world at a statistical level. The problem is pushed back onto whatever is considered fundamental. If there is an original event, it is only uncaused if it doesn't emerge naturally from (for example) the equations that are believed to describe the universe. One can say the same about an infinite past. Your own theory also introduces uncaused events, namely the computations of a universal dovetailer. The whole idea of "everythingism" was inspired by QM, but QM itself doesn't entail that everything happens. If you measure a variable you only get eigenvalues of that variable - not every possible value. If you measure it again you get the same eigenvalue again - not any value. I was given to believe that the computations of the UD aren't events, and that they simply exist within arithmetic as a logically necessary consequence of its existence. Did I get that wrong?I wouldn't say "wrong". It depends on whether you think "There exists a successor of 2." implies that 3 exists. Personally I think it is a confusion to say that a logical formula is satisfied by X is the same as saying X exists in the ontological sense.On the contrary, self-duplication explains the appearance of such indeterminacy, without adding any further assumptions.Well, the existence of self-duplication, even via Everett, is a further assumption. Surely the existence of duplication (rather than self-duplication) arises from the equations? So one has self-duplication as a consequence, to the same extent that one has it within ones own personal past? Or have I misunderstood that too? (Or are you just talking about the sort of assumptions we have to make all the time anyway?)Occam favors it. Your belief in "3)" substitutes a very simple explanation by a call to a form of built-in-non-explainable magic.No more magic than a UD. Why is the UD magic? (Is arithmetic magic?)It's hypothetically generating all possible worlds, but where is it? It's in Platonia. It's "the word made flesh." Sounds a lot more magical than "that atom decayed by potential tunneling just like the equations say."In a sense, one can be more certain about arithmetical reality than the physical reality. An evil demon could be responsible for our belief in atoms, and stars, and photons, etc., but it is may be impossible for that same demon to give us the experience of factoring 7 in to two integers besides 1 and 7.
But that's because we made up 1 and 7 and the defintion of factoring. Their our language and that's why we have control of them.
So while Descartes could doubt physical reality, he could not doubt the "unreality of arithmetically impossible experiences".
I don't think Descartes could doubt physical reality. Even Bruno rejects solipism and that's just doubting the reality of other people. I find it pretty easy to doubt that you can always add one more to an integer. I think 10^10^10 + 1 may well equal 10^10^10 in most contexts.
In that sense, arithmetic would in-part control possible experiences, and is harder to doubt than the possibility that physics is constrains experiences. Indeed, computationalism suggests this is true. An appropriately programmed computer can generate any experience that can be possibly experienced in any universe: our own "laws of physics" do not constrain our possible experience whatsoever,
?? They seem to constrain my experience of breathing under water and flying to Mars.
so long as a Turing machine can be built within the laws of some physical universe.
I know. That's your story and you're sticking to it. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
