On 12/16/2013 1:30 PM, LizR wrote:
On 17 December 2013 10:14, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:

    On 12/16/2013 12:40 PM, LizR wrote:
    On 17 December 2013 08:06, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net
    <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:

        JKC makes a big point of the complete separation of quantum worlds, 
        Everett didn't write about multiple worlds.  Everett only considered 
one world
and wrote about the "relative state" of the observer and the observed system. In some ways this is more fundamental because in principle the "different
        worlds" of MWI can interfere with one another.  That they usually don't 
is a
        statistical result.

    ("Many worlds" is just a nice (and roughly accurate) description, like Big 
    (better than Small Hiss) or Black Hole (better than Very Faintly Glowing 
Region of
    Infinite Gravity :)

        I think that's an unfair criticism of Copenhagen. Deterministic 
theories just
        push the problem back in time.  Ultimately there is either an uncaused 
event or
        an infinite past.  So there is not great intellectual virtue in 
        uncaused events. Quantum mechanics is an interesting intermediate case. 
 It has
        randomness, but randomness that is strictly limited and limited in such 
a way
        that it produces the classical world at a statistical level.

    The problem is pushed back onto whatever is considered fundamental. If 
there is an
    original event, it is only uncaused if it doesn't emerge naturally from (for
    example) the equations that are believed to describe the universe. One can 
say the
    same about an infinite past.

        Your own theory also introduces uncaused events, namely the 
computations of a
        universal dovetailer. The whole idea of "everythingism" was inspired by 
QM, but
        QM itself doesn't entail that everything happens. If you measure a 
variable you
        only get eigenvalues of that variable - not every possible value.  If 
        measure it again you get the same eigenvalue again - not any value.

    I was given to believe that the computations of the UD aren't events, and 
that they
    simply exist within arithmetic as a logically necessary consequence of its
    existence. Did I get that wrong?
    I wouldn't say "wrong".  It depends on whether you think "There exists a 
    of 2." implies that 3 exists. Personally I think it is a confusion to say 
that a
    logical formula is satisfied by X is the same as saying X exists in the 

Is that another way of saying you don't think Arithmetical Realism is correct? (Which is fair enough, of course, it is a supposition.)

Yes. I think it is a questionable hypothesis.

    On the contrary, self-duplication explains the appearance of such 
    without adding any further assumptions.

    Well, the existence of self-duplication, even via Everett, is a further 

Surely the existence of duplication (rather than self-duplication) arises from the equations? So one has self-duplication as a consequence, to the same extent that one has it within ones own personal past? Or have I misunderstood that too?

(Or are you just talking about the sort of assumptions we have to make all the time anyway?)

    Occam favors it. Your belief in "3)" substitutes a very simple explanation 
by a
    call to a form of built-in-non-explainable magic.

    No more magic than a UD.

Why is the UD magic? (Is arithmetic magic?)

    It's hypothetically generating all possible worlds, but where is it?  It's 
    Platonia.  It's "the word made flesh."  Sounds a lot more magical than 
"that atom
    decayed by potential tunneling just like the equations say."

Well if you don't think AR is correct, then of course it sounds magical (although that leaves the problem of how those equations which somehow (magically?) control the behaviour of atoms actually do so.)

I don't think they 'control' them, I think they describe them (to the best of our knowledge). Notice that this explains "where the laws of physics come from"; they're invented by us.

Personally, I don't find the "argument from incredulity" works for me any more towards maths being "less real" than primitive matter. Maybe I've been in contact with Bruno for too long.

Bruno, has a good point about 'primitive matter'. It doesn't really mean anything except 'the stuff our equations apply to.'; but since the equations are made up descriptions, the stuff they apply to is part of the model - not necessarily the ding an sich. To say physicist assume primitive matter is little more than saying that they make models and some stuff is in the model and some isn't - which of course is contrary to the usual assumption on this list. :-)


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