On 17 December 2013 08:06, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:

> JKC makes a big point of the complete separation of quantum worlds,
> although Everett didn't write about multiple worlds.  Everett only
> considered one world and wrote about the "relative state" of the observer
> and the observed system.  In some ways this is more fundamental because in
> principle the "different worlds" of MWI can interfere with one another.
> That they usually don't is a statistical result.
>
> ("Many worlds" is just a nice (and roughly accurate) description, like Big
Bang (better than Small Hiss) or Black Hole (better than Very Faintly
Glowing Region of Infinite Gravity :)

I think that's an unfair criticism of Copenhagen.  Deterministic theories
> just push the problem back in time.  Ultimately there is either an uncaused
> event or an infinite past.  So there is not great intellectual virtue in
> rejecting uncaused events.  Quantum mechanics is an interesting
> intermediate case.  It has randomness, but randomness that is strictly
> limited and limited in such a way that it produces the classical world at a
> statistical level.
>

The problem is pushed back onto whatever is considered fundamental. If
there is an original event, it is only uncaused if it doesn't emerge
naturally from (for example) the equations that are believed to describe
the universe. One can say the same about an infinite past.

Your own theory also introduces uncaused events, namely the computations of
> a universal dovetailer.  The whole idea of "everythingism" was inspired by
> QM, but QM itself doesn't entail that everything happens. If you measure a
> variable you only get eigenvalues of that variable - not every possible
> value.  If you measure it again you get the same eigenvalue again - not any
> value.
>

I was given to believe that the computations of the UD aren't events, and
that they simply exist within arithmetic as a logically necessary
consequence of its existence. Did I get that wrong?

 On the contrary, self-duplication explains the appearance of such
> indeterminacy, without adding any further assumptions.
>
 Well, the existence of self-duplication, even via Everett, is a further
assumption.

Surely the existence of duplication (rather than self-duplication) arises
from the equations? So one has self-duplication as a consequence, to the
same extent that one has it within ones own personal past? Or have I
misunderstood that too?

(Or are you just talking about the sort of assumptions we have to make all
the time anyway?)

 Occam favors it. Your belief in "3)" substitutes a very simple explanation
> by a call to a form of built-in-non-explainable magic.
>
 No more magic than a UD.

Why is the UD magic? (Is arithmetic magic?)

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

Reply via email to