On 12/16/2013 12:40 PM, LizR wrote:
On 17 December 2013 08:06, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:


    JKC makes a big point of the complete separation of quantum worlds, 
although Everett
    didn't write about multiple worlds. Everett only considered one world and 
wrote
    about the "relative state" of the observer and the observed system.  In 
some ways
    this is more fundamental because in principle the "different worlds" of MWI 
can
    interfere with one another.  That they usually don't is a statistical 
result.

("Many worlds" is just a nice (and roughly accurate) description, like Big Bang (better than Small Hiss) or Black Hole (better than Very Faintly Glowing Region of Infinite Gravity :)

    I think that's an unfair criticism of Copenhagen. Deterministic theories 
just push
    the problem back in time.  Ultimately there is either an uncaused event or 
an
    infinite past.  So there is not great intellectual virtue in rejecting 
uncaused
    events.  Quantum mechanics is an interesting intermediate case.  It has 
randomness,
    but randomness that is strictly limited and limited in such a way that it 
produces
    the classical world at a statistical level.


The problem is pushed back onto whatever is considered fundamental. If there is an original event, it is only uncaused if it doesn't emerge naturally from (for example) the equations that are believed to describe the universe. One can say the same about an infinite past.

    Your own theory also introduces uncaused events, namely the computations of 
a
    universal dovetailer.  The whole idea of "everythingism" was inspired by 
QM, but QM
    itself doesn't entail that everything happens. If you measure a variable 
you only
    get eigenvalues of that variable - not every possible value.  If you 
measure it
    again you get the same eigenvalue again - not any value.


I was given to believe that the computations of the UD aren't events, and that they simply exist within arithmetic as a logically necessary consequence of its existence. Did I get that wrong?

I wouldn't say "wrong". It depends on whether you think "There exists a successor of 2." implies that 3 exists. Personally I think it is a confusion to say that a logical formula is satisfied by X is the same as saying X exists in the ontological sense.

    On the contrary, self-duplication explains the appearance of such 
indeterminacy,
    without adding any further assumptions.

    Well, the existence of self-duplication, even via Everett, is a further 
assumption.

Surely the existence of duplication (rather than self-duplication) arises from the equations? So one has self-duplication as a consequence, to the same extent that one has it within ones own personal past? Or have I misunderstood that too?

(Or are you just talking about the sort of assumptions we have to make all the 
time anyway?)

    Occam favors it. Your belief in "3)" substitutes a very simple explanation 
by a
    call to a form of built-in-non-explainable magic.

    No more magic than a UD.

Why is the UD magic? (Is arithmetic magic?)


It's hypothetically generating all possible worlds, but where is it? It's in Platonia. It's "the word made flesh." Sounds a lot more magical than "that atom decayed by potential tunneling just like the equations say."

Brent

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