On 17 December 2013 10:14, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
> On 12/16/2013 12:40 PM, LizR wrote:
> On 17 December 2013 08:06, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
>> JKC makes a big point of the complete separation of quantum worlds,
>> although Everett didn't write about multiple worlds. Everett only
>> considered one world and wrote about the "relative state" of the observer
>> and the observed system. In some ways this is more fundamental because in
>> principle the "different worlds" of MWI can interfere with one another.
>> That they usually don't is a statistical result.
>> ("Many worlds" is just a nice (and roughly accurate) description, like
> Big Bang (better than Small Hiss) or Black Hole (better than Very Faintly
> Glowing Region of Infinite Gravity :)
> I think that's an unfair criticism of Copenhagen. Deterministic theories
>> just push the problem back in time. Ultimately there is either an uncaused
>> event or an infinite past. So there is not great intellectual virtue in
>> rejecting uncaused events. Quantum mechanics is an interesting
>> intermediate case. It has randomness, but randomness that is strictly
>> limited and limited in such a way that it produces the classical world at a
>> statistical level.
> The problem is pushed back onto whatever is considered fundamental. If
> there is an original event, it is only uncaused if it doesn't emerge
> naturally from (for example) the equations that are believed to describe
> the universe. One can say the same about an infinite past.
> Your own theory also introduces uncaused events, namely the computations
>> of a universal dovetailer. The whole idea of "everythingism" was inspired
>> by QM, but QM itself doesn't entail that everything happens. If you measure
>> a variable you only get eigenvalues of that variable - not every possible
>> value. If you measure it again you get the same eigenvalue again - not any
> I was given to believe that the computations of the UD aren't events,
> and that they simply exist within arithmetic as a logically necessary
> consequence of its existence. Did I get that wrong?
> I wouldn't say "wrong". It depends on whether you think "There exists a
> successor of 2." implies that 3 exists. Personally I think it is a
> confusion to say that a logical formula is satisfied by X is the same as
> saying X exists in the ontological sense.
> Is that another way of saying you don't think Arithmetical Realism is
correct? (Which is fair enough, of course, it is a supposition.)
On the contrary, self-duplication explains the appearance of such
> indeterminacy, without adding any further assumptions.
Well, the existence of self-duplication, even via Everett, is a further
Surely the existence of duplication (rather than self-duplication) arises
from the equations? So one has self-duplication as a consequence, to the
same extent that one has it within ones own personal past? Or have I
misunderstood that too?
(Or are you just talking about the sort of assumptions we have to make all
the time anyway?)
Occam favors it. Your belief in "3)" substitutes a very simple
> explanation by a call to a form of built-in-non-explainable magic.
No more magic than a UD.
Why is the UD magic? (Is arithmetic magic?)
It's hypothetically generating all possible worlds, but where is it? It's
> in Platonia. It's "the word made flesh." Sounds a lot more magical than
> "that atom decayed by potential tunneling just like the equations say."
> Well if you don't think AR is correct, then of course it sounds magical
(although that leaves the problem of how those equations which somehow
(magically?) control the behaviour of atoms actually do so.)
Personally, I don't find the "argument from incredulity" works for me any
more towards maths being "less real" than primitive matter. Maybe I've been
in contact with Bruno for too long.
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