On Dec 31, 2013, at 8:28 AM, "Edgar L. Owen" <[email protected]> wrote:
Jason,
Thanks for asking. I'll start a new topic on Consciousness hopefully
sometime today as it is clearly an important topic on its own.....
Edgar
On Tuesday, December 31, 2013 12:13:26 AM UTC-5, Jason wrote:
On Mon, Dec 30, 2013 at 2:17 AM, Jason Resch <[email protected]>
wrote:
Do you think a computer can be conscious?
If yes, then do you think the experience of the consciousness within
the computer would be different if the computer existed in a block-
time universes instead of a moving-present universe? If so, how/
what would cause the states of the evolving computer program to take
a different course in the block universe vs. the moving present
universe? If you see no reason the computations should diverge,
then you must agree the states reached by the computer program are
the same, and since they are the same the conscious program could
not behave any differently. This includes any realization that it
is in a block-time vs. a moving-present universe.
Edgar,
I am particularly curious to hear what you think of the above
reasoning. It seems that it applies to your theory which I believe
at some level holds that the right computations can produce
consciousness.
Thanks,
Jason
Edgar,
Thanks for your reply in the other thread. I see you answer that
consciousness is the result of a computation.
If a conscious computation believes and feels like it is in a single
moving present moment, do you agree it will feel this way so long as
the same computation is performed, regardless of the hardware that
executed it?
If so, shouldn't it follow that whether the computation exists in a
moving present or in a block universe, that the conscious computation
will still feel and believe it exists in a single present moment?
I don't see how any theory that uses the computational theory of mind
can escape this conclusion. As a consequence of it, we cannot use our
feeling of existing in a single present as any kind of true indicator
for what the reality of the matter is.
Jason
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