2014/1/3 John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com <mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com>>

        On Thu, Jan 2, 2014 at 4:29 PM, Quentin Anciaux <allco...@gmail.com
        <mailto:allco...@gmail.com>> wrote:

            > There is no FTL in MWI.

        If you say so. And now that we know on the authority of Quentin Anciaux 
that MWI
        is local and because we already knew that MWI is a realistic theory we 
        conclude with absolute confidence that MWI is untrue because it does 
not agree
        with experiment, and if something doesn't agree with experiment that's 
the end
        of the story, it has to go.



I find the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy has a good discussion of MWI

The MWI exhibits some kind of nonlocality: "world" is a nonlocal concept, but it avoids action at a distance and, therefore, it is not in conflict with the relativistic quantum mechanics; see discussions of nonlocality in Vaidman 1994 <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qm-manyworlds/#Vai94>, Tipler 2000 <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qm-manyworlds/#Tip00>, Bacciagaluppi 2002 <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qm-manyworlds/#Bac02>, and Hemmo and Pitowsky 2001 <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qm-manyworlds/#Hem01>. Although the issues of (non)locality are most transparent in the Schrödinger representation, an additional insight can be gained through recent analysis in the framework of the Heisenberg representation, see Deutsch and Hayden 2000 <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qm-manyworlds/#Deu00>, Rubin 2001 <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qm-manyworlds/#Rub01>, and Deutsch 2001 <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qm-manyworlds/#Deu01>. The most celebrated example of nonlocality was given by Bell 1964 <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qm-manyworlds/#Bel64> in the context of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen argument <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qt-epr/>. However, in the framework of the MWI, Bell's argument cannot get off the ground because it requires a predetermined single outcome of a quantum experiment.

It also discusses the multiple-minds interpretation, which seems to be a more metaphysically extravagant version of Fuchs subjective Bayesian interpretation.


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