Edgar, That begs the question. You start by assuming reality is computed, and then conclude that because reality exists, reality must be computed.
Again I will point out that except for one key difference, your ideas and Bruno's are actually pretty similar. The difference of course being that the UDA entails that there are an infinity of computed realities. Let me approach this from a different direction. Given that you agree that you could be digitally replaced and not notice the difference, this also entails that you could be placed into a simulation, where your simulated brain is functionally identical to your real brain or the prosthetic brain that could replace it with you noticing. So a simulation of you embedded in a simulated world is also conscious - this is more or less what your theory of consciousness says. The next step is to see that there are an infinity of possible simulations that contain your current brain state, and thus your consciousness, in this moment (or any given moment). If you're still with me we can go back to the UDA, which in so many words says that all of these infinite simulations exist in Platonia, traced by the Universal Dovetailer (a rather simple program) - and your moment by moment reality is a view from the inside of the infinity of simulations that contain you. Indeed, physics and the physical world in general represent a stable measure on the kinds of worlds that could support your consciousness. But because the infinity of simulations is necessarily what renders the physical world, it is not computable. That is the contradiction entailed by a computational universe such as you elaborate in your theory. Your objection about human math and reality math, I believe, is an attempt to refute step 8 of the UDA - that is usually the most problematic step for people who don't agree with the UDA. It would be very interesting if you could identify a flaw in the UDA, supported by arguments rather than simple assertion, as you have done to this point. Terren On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 9:34 PM, Edgar L. Owen <[email protected]> wrote: > Liz, > > No, that's not the only way to falsify it. One merely needs to show it > doesn't properly describe reality as I've just done. If you even assume a > computational universe in the first place you have to assume (you are > assuming) that it computes reality. The fact that reality exists is > conclusive proof. > > Edgar > > > > On Thursday, January 9, 2014 8:53:18 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote: > >> On 10 January 2014 14:22, Edgar L. Owen <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> Liz, >>> >>> No, I don't agree with that at all. As I've said on a number of >>> occasions, reality is obviously computed because it exists. What more >>> convincing proof could there be? >>> >> >> One that explains why that has to be so would be a good start. >> >> >>> If Bruno's comp claims reality is non-computable it's pure nonsense >>> that is conclusively falsified by the very existence of reality. >>> >>> The point is that certain assumptions lead to certain conclusions. If >> the conclusions invalidate the assumptions, then the correct response is to >> throw out the original assumptions as invalid. Bruno starts from the >> assumption that consciousness is a form of computation and draws certain >> inferences. This isn't what comp "claims" it's what the argument shows, >> given the assumptions. The only way to falsify it is to show that one of >> the assumptions is wrong, or that there is a flaw in the reasoning that >> leads to the conclusions. >> >> >> -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
