On Sunday, January 12, 2014 5:41:15 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 12 Jan 2014, at 05:12, Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote: > > RE: arXiv: 1401.1219v1 [quant-ph] 6 Jan 2014 > Consciousness as a State of Matter > Max Tegmark, January 8, 2014 > > Hi Folk, > Grrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr! > I confess that after 12 years of deep immersion in science’s grapplings > with consciousness, the blindspot I see operating is so obvious and so > pervasive and so incredibly unseen it beggars belief. I know it’s a long > way from physics to neuroscience (discipline-wise). But surely in 2014 we > can see it for what it is. Can’t they (Tegmark and ilk) see that the > so-called “science of consciousness” is > · the “the science of the scientific observer” > > > That's observation theory, not consciousness theories. >
Observation is part of consciousness. Without consciousness there is no observation. > > > · trying to explain observing with observations > > > Of course you need logic, ans some assumption on the mind (like > computationalism assume mind to be invariant for Turing simulation). > Since observation is part of consciousness, he is pointing out that trying to explain consciousness without recognizing that all evidence of it comes from consciousness is circular reasoning. Whether or not we need assumptions for our theories is not relevant to the ontology of consciousness. > > > · trying to explain experience with experiences > > > Well, at some level, we can't avoid that, but the experience are extended > into testable theories. > Tests and theories are experiences. > > > > · trying to explain how scientists do science. > > > In some theoretical frame. yes, "meta-science" can be handled > scientifically (= modestly). > But consciousness ≠ modesty or science. > > > · a science of scientific behaviour. > · Descriptive and never explanatory. > > > You overgeneralize. That is the case of physics, but not of > meta-mathematics in the comp frame. I recall to you that computationalism > is incompatible with physicalism. > Why is meta-mathematics in comp more explanatory? > > > > > · Assuming that the use of consciousness to confirm ‘laws of > nature’ contacts the actual underlying reality... > > > That's partly wrong, partly correct. > That's partly information about an opinion, mostly cryptic. > > > > · Assuming there’s only 1 scientific behaviour and never ever > ever questioning that. > > > ? > That's fuzzy, and false, as far as I can interpret it precisely. > It's supposed to be false. He's giving another example of how scientific approaches to consciousness beg the question and deceive themselves. It means precisely that in reality there are many, many tools within science and reason, but the contemporary approaches consolidate science into a single dogmatic ideology. > > > > · Assuming scientists are not scientific evidence of anything. > > > That's false in Everett QM, and in computationalism. > They still do not contain scientists, only toy models of the footprint that first person interaction imposes on 3p functions. Craig > > > > <span class="Apple-style-span" style="border-collapse: separate; color: > rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Helvetica; font-style: normal; font-varia > > ... -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
