On 14 Jan 2014, at 18:44, Stephen Paul King wrote:

Dear Bruno,

I disagree. A universal number is still a number and this is an idea of a mind.

This contradicts your admission, if I remember correctly, that "23 is prime" is true or false independently of us. "2+2=4" is infinitely conceptually simpler than anything involving a "mind", which is what we want to explain. I think that you confuse just numbers, and human's idea of number, which indeed are an idea of the human mind. If not, comp does not make sense at the start, and your critics is on the "step zero".



Even if such a mind is degenerate in that it cannot be ever complete,

All machine's (even in weaker sense that the comp sense) can ever be complete. Only complex non computable sets can be semantically complete.



it still have finite subsets that are indistinguishable from finite minds. The eternal running of the UD is such a eternal process. Replace the Parmenides' Being with Heraclitus' Becoming and Plato is correct.

It is far easier to explain becoming, in the indexical way, from some being than making "becoming" primitive. If becoming and mind are primitive, you are back to dualism or a form of idealism.



We cannot forget that numbers, like any other representation can be self-defining and thus the mind in the numbers is the mind that contains the numbers,

No. .... the mind that is contained in the relation of the number with its (probable) universal neighboring numbers.



thus it is only neutral when both it and its infinite physical implementations vanish into the Void.

Only the Void is neutral.


Only in your quite idiosyncratic way, sorry. And "void" needs to assume some notion of "things" that you must make precise so that we know what the void is empty of.

Bruno





On Tue, Jan 14, 2014 at 12:17 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

On 14 Jan 2014, at 17:31, Jason Resch wrote:




On Tue, Jan 14, 2014 at 4:39 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

On 14 Jan 2014, at 06:47, Jason Resch wrote:




On Mon, Jan 13, 2014 at 9:38 PM, Edgar L. Owen <edgaro...@att.net> wrote:
Jason,

A good question, that's why I've already listed a number of the most basic axioms and concepts of the theory.

Okay, thanks. Could you clarify which are axioms (assumptions) and which are the ones derived from those axioms?


1. Existence must exist because non-existence cannot exist.
2. Reality is a logically consistent and logically complete structure. 3. The theory must be consistent with and attempt to explain all the actual equations of science insofar as they are known and valid, but NOT the interpretations of those equations. It must be consistent with the actual science (the equations) but not with the interpretations of the science, which in my view is often completely wrong. 4. Reality is an evolving computational structure which continually computes the current state of the universe. 5. This reality consists only of evolving information rather than a physical, material world. 6. These computations produce a real universe state with real effects because they run in reality itself, in the logical space and presence of existence, what I call ontological energy. 7. What actually exists is all that can or could exist. The existence of reality as it actually is conclusively falsifies all other possible realities. Thus the past is the only possible past that could have existed because it is the only one that does exist. Thus the original extended fine tuning is the only one that is possible because it is the only one that is actual. 8. Reality exists only in a present moment. Reality must be present to be real. It's presence manifests as the present moment in which we all exist.

etc. etc. etc. There are hundreds of other basic concepts... Which come from which you can judge...

If they are all axioms, then none of them should come from any other, as then it wouldn't be an assumption but a deduction. For example, in the first one you say "existence must exist because non-existence cannot exist". It would seem then that "non- existence cannot exist" is an axiom, and from that it follows that existence must exist. Regarding the second point, I understand what you mean by logically consistent but what do you mean by logically complete?


The whole last part of my book, Part VII, is a concise summary of the basic axioms and concepts of the whole theory. It's as close to a formal presentation of the theory as I have.


This reminded me of the 14 points Godel wrote that defined his philosophy. His were:

The world is rational.
Human reason can, in principle, be developed more highly (through certain techniques). There are systematic methods for the solution of all problems (also art, etc.). There are other worlds and rational beings of a different and higher kind. The world in which we live is not the only one in which we shall live or have lived. There is incomparably more knowable a priori than is currently known. The development of human thought since the Renaissance is thoroughly intelligible (durchaus einsichtige).
Reason in mankind will be developed in every direction.
Formal rights comprise a real science.
Materialism is false.

Unfortunately, Gödel still believed in the weak materialism, and so was skeptical and hesitating on Church thesis and computationalism. He missed the consequences,as Einstein (and himself) missed Everett.




The higher beings are connected to the others by analogy, not by composition.
Concepts have an objective existence.
There is a scientific (exact) philosophy and theology, which deals with concepts of the highest abstractness; and this is also most highly fruitful for science.
Religions are, for the most part, bad– but religion is not.

All points are consistent with comp. But comp makes stronger statement: 10 becomes "Weak materialism" is false, for example.

Bruno




Bruno,

What is the distinction between materialism and weak materialism? I tried to search on Google but found no clear answer. Thanks.

Weak materialism is the belief in primitive matter, or the belief that matter must be assumed, and is not a derivable emerging notion. Both dualist and material-monist are weak materialist.

I would prefer to call that "materialism" simply. But I am forced to add "weak" because the term "materialism" in philosophy of mind has a different meaning. It means "belief in *only* matter", the rest being emergent. It is opposed to dualism, which is weak materialism and weak mentalism. Materialism, in philosophy of mind is a material or physical monism.

To sum up:
weak materialism = belief in primitive matter.
weak idealism = belief in primitive ideas
materialism = belief in only matter
idealism = belief in only ideas.

Comp is eventually neutral monist, unless you classify numbers as ideas, but this is misleading, because with comp we define basically a (mental) idea by a number (code) interpretable by a universal number.

Bruno




Jason

Your point 2 sounds like Godel's first point, and your fifth one sounds like Godel's 10th.

Jason


Edgar




On Monday, January 13, 2014 9:55:38 PM UTC-5, Jason wrote:
Edgard,

You've described the conclusions you've come to in theory, but not what you are assuming at the start. So what are those minimal assumptions you took as true at the start which led to your other deductions?

Thanks,

Jason


On Mon, Jan 13, 2014 at 8:23 PM, Edgar L. Owen <edga...@att.net> wrote:
Jason,

I've already presented a good part of my theory repeatedly in considerable detail giving good logical arguments. The only 'jargon' I've used is the single neologism 'ontological energy' which I've defined clearly.

I can't help it if reality is a difficult subject. What frustrates me is not the disagreements which are to be expected but disagreements based on misunderstanding of what I've stated quite clearly and people thinking I've said the exact opposite. That is most certainly not a problem with the explanations but with the reading....

Edgar

On Monday, January 13, 2014 9:13:05 PM UTC-5, Jason wrote:



On Mon, Jan 13, 2014 at 5:42 PM, Edgar L. Owen <edga...@att.net> wrote:
Liz,

Sigh.... Now we have several people complaining because I haven't offered a 'formal theory'.

A first (and great) step would be just to explain in clear normal language (no jargon) what you assume, and what you derive from those assumptions. You don't have to give us a bunch of equations.

Jason


However not a single one of the complainers has themselves offered a formal theory even though they are continually offering theories of their own, none of which are formalized. Is that fair?

The only person on this group who has a formal theory that I'm aware of is Bruno. No one else? You don't have one of your own but you are criticizing me because I don't have one?

What you guys don't seem to understand is that whether a theory accurately describes reality or not is a much more important criterion than whether that theory is formalized or not. Physics described reality quite accurately for years before it reached its current degree of formalization and that's why it was accepted.

Doesn't really matter whether you have a formal theory or not if there is no connection to reality now does there? Bruno's theory is apparently quite tightly formalized but I see none of the required actual consistency with reality to indicate it actually applies to reality at all.

Bruno's theory may itself be logically consistent, but I see no consistency with actual reality. Mine on the other hand is entirely consistent with actual reality because it clearly states that the computations of its computational reality are precisely what is actually necessary to compute the real processes of nature, whatever they are.

Bruno's on the other hand makes the wild and unsubstantiated assumption that all possible math is 'out there' in reality somehow even if it's doing nothing. A very improbable assumption there is no empirical evidence for whatsoever. Doesn't matter in the least if the logical consequences of that initial assumption are tight and valid (a formalized theory) if the assumption itself isn't.

I just hope you guys understand what I'm saying is a basis of scientific method. Doesn't matter so much if a theory is formalized. What matters is its explanatory power and consistency with actually observed phenomena.

Edgar


My theory on the other hand takes

On Monday, January 13, 2014 4:52:34 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote:
On 14 January 2014 04:31, Edgar L. Owen <edga...@att.net> wrote:
Stephen,

It's not 'ideal monism'. Trying to shoehorn it won't help you understand it.

Just take the pure information content of everything that exists out of the 'things'. You have pure information. Now assume that information is continually evolving to compute the current state of reality. Where does it exist and evolve? Not in a physical world, but in the presence of reality itself. Only because there is something that exists called reality which supports these computations do they become real and actual...

Ooh, "It from bit!"

If you want to take the pure information content out of things, you have to explain what that means. Try a simple example. An electron, perhaps? The information content is an electric charge, a mass, a spin. I think that's all, isn't it? So, what does it mean for that information to be extracted, where does it live, how does it evolve, etc? Over to you!

We can move on to "the presence of reality itself" once we have a formal definition or worked examples (or SOMETHING) for the information part.


--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com.

Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.


--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.


--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com .
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.


--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com .
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.


--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




--
You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this topic, visit https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/TBc_y2MZV5c/unsubscribe . To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com .
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.



--
Kindest Regards,

Stephen Paul King

Senior Researcher
Mobile: (864) 567-3099

stephe...@provensecure.com

 http://www.provensecure.us/




“This message (including any attachments) is intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which it is addressed, and may contain information that is non-public, proprietary, privileged, confidential and exempt from disclosure under applicable law or may be constituted as attorney work product. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any use, dissemination, distribution, or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received this message in error, notify sender immediately and delete this message immediately.”


--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

Reply via email to