On 16 Jan 2014, at 10:41, Alberto G. Corona wrote:

I tend not to consider that a brain is a digital computer.

I agree.
Then comp explains completely why a brain is definitely not a digital computer. A brain is a physical object. And if you grasp the step seven, you should understand than a priori, the physical is not computable as it results from a sum on infinities of computations (by the invariance of the first person consciousness for the FPI).

Don't confuse the bad metaphor: "brain = computer", with the quite fertile theological assumption: "my consciousness can be recovered by a computer emulating my brain at some level".

Brain is a computer, at the least, as a brain can emulate a universal Turing machine. But a brain is not a number that the UD will ever emulate. A brain is what some universal numbers perceive when they look at themselves in some histories. And in the details, they do not see an object, but a map of the possible futures (the "orbital" stationnary wave, hoping comp gives QM.







The most
accurate analogy is that a brain is a _program_ made of different
processes that run certain specific algorithms, some of them fixed and
certain of them capable of learning by various methods. And finally
some of them can execute an unconscious selection game of try an error
with matching ideas. And that is only the beginning. probably at the
neural level the processing is not as simple as the AI experts
suppose.

I agree. We must also take into account the much more numerous glial cells. Today, we have reason to believe that they communicate a lot between themselves, and sometimes with neurons.





Such program made of processes and minute details, created by
a genetic program that determine the architecture. And don't forget
the learning process in childhood that influence also the connections
and weights of some constants.

Of all of this, we know almost nothing.

OK. But all what you describabe is Turing emulable.





So it happens like in all biological systems. At first, everything
looks simple. when you go down in the details, everything gets almost
infinitely complicated. The brain is an extreme example of that.

The Mandelbrot set too.



So when people say that the brain is like a digital computer or that
it is "turing emulable" I think on a stone age adolescent that cut a
tree to cross the ocean. Yes it is theoretically possible, little
ignorant, but donĀ“t make me laugh.

The only evidence for something not Turing emulable in Nature is the wave collapse. But it seems to be Turing-recoverable, I would say, by the FPI.

So it is you who make a gross hypothesis by assuming something non computable at the start, or in the primitive things. That leads to arbitrariness, and seems to make things more complex than needed. Comp and computer science entails already that machines are confronted with non computable aspect of their reality/realities.

It is simpler to work in a theory which seems to work, until we find it does not work, and so we can move forward. If not you are assuming something is wrong, and miss the opportunity to show what is wrong and or to improve or abandon it.

Bruno







2014/1/16, Stathis Papaioannou <stath...@gmail.com>:
On 16 January 2014 16:26, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com> wrote:
The computational metaphor in the sense of the brain works like the Intel CPU inside the box on your desk is clearly misleading, but the sense that
a
computer can in theory do everything your brain can do is almost
certainly
correct. It is not that the brain is like a computer, but rather, that a computer can be like almost anything, including your brain or body, or
entire planet and all the people on it.

Jason

I think neuroscientists have, over decades, used the computational
metaphor in too literal a way. It is obviously not true that the brain
is a digital computer, just as it is not true that the weather is a
digital computer. But a digital computer can simulate the behaviour of
any physical process in the universe (if physics is computable),
including the behaviour of weather or the human brain. That means
that, at least, it would be possible to make a philosophical zombie
using a computer. The only way to avoid this conclusion would be if
physics, and specifically the physics in the brain, is not computable.
Pointing out where the non-computable physics is in the brain rarely
figures on the agenda of the anti-computationalists. And even if there
is non-computational physics in the brain, that invalidates
computationalism, but not its superset, functionalism.


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