On 17 January 2014 18:03, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:

> Briefly, computationalism is the idea that you could replace the brain
>> with a Turing machine and you would preserve the mind. This would not
>> be possible if there is non-computable physics in the brain,
> Just to clarify, as I understand Bruno's theory, there is non-computable
> physics in the brain.  In fact physics is non-computable in general, BUT
> the mind is computable, i.e. the level of substitution that preserves the
> person is above the fundamental physics level.  I actually think this last
> is dubious.

I also find it unlikely that the subst level is above the quantum level. Or
at least I think that if it's at the quantum level then we can guarantee
that the duplication arguments would work (assuming we could duplicate
objects at that level, which we can't due to a fundamental principle...!)

Actually Brent, your comment above reads like a refutation of comp, which I
suspect isn't the intention.

Or is it? I read it as

1 Comp says fundamental physics is non-computable.
2 Comp says the mind is the result of a computation.
3 Hence if the subst level is at the level of fundamental physics, 2 can't
be correct
4 I think it IS at the quantum level, so 2 is wrong, so comp is wrong - QED

However, surely comp says the mind is the result of computations in
Platonia, rather than in the brain? In fact it says that the brain doesn't
exist (along with everything else, apart from Platonia).

I feel as though my own brain is about to boggle, or would if it existed.
Maybe I should write everything "under erasure" to be on the safe side!

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