On 17 January 2014 01:17, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>
> On Jan 16, 2014, at 2:11 AM, Stathis Papaioannou <stath...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> On 16 January 2014 16:26, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>> The computational metaphor in the sense of the brain works like the Intel
>>> CPU inside the box on your desk is clearly misleading, but the sense that
>>> a
>>> computer can in theory do everything your brain can do is almost
>>> certainly
>>> correct. It is not that the brain is like a computer, but rather, that a
>>> computer can be like almost anything, including your brain or body, or
>>> entire planet and all the people on it.
>>>
>>> Jason
>>
>>
>> I think neuroscientists have, over decades, used the computational
>> metaphor in too literal a way. It is obviously not true that the brain
>> is a digital computer, just as it is not true that the weather is a
>> digital computer. But a digital computer can simulate the behaviour of
>> any physical process in the universe (if physics is computable),
>> including the behaviour of weather or the human brain. That means
>> that, at least, it would be possible to make a philosophical zombie
>> using a computer.
>
>
> How does this follow? Personally I don't find the notion that philosophical
> zombies make logical sense at all.

I meant that if the physics of the brain is computable it follows as a
straighforward deduction that it would *at least* be possible to make
a philosophical zombie. It is then a further argument to show that it
would not be a zombie but a conscious being.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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