On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 6:49 PM, LizR <[email protected]> wrote: > On 17 January 2014 13:43, Jason Resch <[email protected]> wrote: > >> On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 6:42 PM, LizR <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> On 17 January 2014 13:34, Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]>wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> I meant that if the physics of the brain is computable it follows as a >>>> straighforward deduction that it would *at least* be possible to make >>>> a philosophical zombie. It is then a further argument to show that it >>>> would not be a zombie but a conscious being. >>>> >>>> I don't see this. Why would it at least be possible to make a p-zombie? >>> (And if you can show by a further argument that it's a conscious being, >>> then clearly it *wasn't *a zombie...) >>> >> >> I think he means that strong AI would be possible, and then strong AI + >> comp -> conscious programs. >> > > I think I see. Strong AI implies intelligent programmes, but not > necessarily conscious ones. However I'm still not sure about philosophical > zombies, which I believe mimic human beings completely without being > conscious. > > > Right, so if you think there can be intelligent programs and you believe zombies are impossible, then it implies computationalism.
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