On 17 Jan 2014, at 01:49, LizR wrote:

On 17 January 2014 13:43, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com> wrote:
On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 6:42 PM, LizR <lizj...@gmail.com> wrote:
On 17 January 2014 13:34, Stathis Papaioannou <stath...@gmail.com> wrote:

I meant that if the physics of the brain is computable it follows as a
straighforward deduction that it would *at least* be possible to make
a philosophical zombie. It is then a further argument to show that it
would not be a zombie but a conscious being.

I don't see this. Why would it at least be possible to make a p- zombie? (And if you can show by a further argument that it's a conscious being, then clearly it wasn't a zombie...)

I think he means that strong AI would be possible, and then strong AI + comp -> conscious programs.

I think I see. Strong AI implies intelligent programmes,

That weak AI, or beh-mech (or just AI, actually).



but not necessarily conscious ones. However I'm still not sure about philosophical zombies, which I believe mimic human beings completely without being conscious.

You are not asked to be able to build them, or justify their existence from what you know. You are asked to logically conceive them. If you can show that zombie are logically impossible, you would solve at once the "hard" part of the consciousness problem.

The (mind-body) problem is that if the 3p behavior of a brain explains entirely the 3p behavior of a person, it *looks* like consciousness has no role at all. That's lead to eliminativism, or worse, epiphenomenalism (consciousness exists but has no role at all).

I think comp solves the problem, but with a big price: the disparition of an ontological physics. The fundamental science is ... Arithmetic, or theology (from inside).

Bruno




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