On 17 January 2014 14:00, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com> wrote:

> On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 6:49 PM, LizR <lizj...@gmail.com> wrote:
>> On 17 January 2014 13:43, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>> On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 6:42 PM, LizR <lizj...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>> On 17 January 2014 13:34, Stathis Papaioannou <stath...@gmail.com>wrote:
>>>>> I meant that if the physics of the brain is computable it follows as a
>>>>> straighforward deduction that it would *at least* be possible to make
>>>>> a philosophical zombie. It is then a further argument to show that it
>>>>> would not be a zombie but a conscious being.
>>>>> I don't see this. Why would it at least be possible to make a
>>>> p-zombie? (And if you can show by a further argument that it's a conscious
>>>> being, then clearly it *wasn't *a zombie...)
>>> I think he means that strong AI would be possible, and then strong AI +
>>> comp -> conscious programs.
>> I think I see. Strong AI implies intelligent programmes, but not
>> necessarily conscious ones. However I'm still not sure about philosophical
>> zombies, which I believe mimic human beings completely without being
>> conscious.
> Right, so if you think there can be intelligent programs and you believe
> zombies are impossible, then it implies computationalism.
> I guess so. It's just the "argument from incredulity" really, which I
admit doesn't stand up. I just can't imagine how a programme could imitate
a person convincingly for a long time without being conscious.

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