Dear Bruno,

  Could you ever stop being obtuse?


On Sat, Jan 18, 2014 at 6:04 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

>
> On 17 Jan 2014, at 21:01, Stephen Paul King wrote:
>
> Dear Bruno,
>
>   I think that you are setting up a false dichotomy with the notion of "a
> finite unique physical universe" in Step 8 of the UDA! In my thinking each
> and every observer has its own unique "finite unique physical universe"
>
>
> Why?
>
>
>
> (thus each 1p is unique and FPI follows from the inability to exactly
> compute some one elses 1p from yours.
>
>
> Unclear.
>
>
>
>
> See A.A. Markov's theorem of the computational intractability of the
> decision process of whether a pair of 4-manifolds are smooth diffeomorphic
> as a form of FPI argument.)
>
>
> Irrelevant.
>
>
>
>    A real 3-p would be the intersection of infinitely many of 1p's of
> observers, it has vanishing or "null" content.
>
>
> 3p is easier than 1p.
>
>
>
>
> We can obtain all that we know as "physics" by the notion of what some
> mutually consistent 1p have in common. (Thus a "substitution level" obtains
> automatically.)
>
>
> How. Give an example.
>
>
>
>    If a pair of observers
>
>
> Definition?
>
>
>
> are such that their 1p's cannot be consistently combined, then they cannot
> be said to interact or communicate.
>
>
> Why?
>
>
>
> I start my reasoning with infinitely many observers, not one. It makes a
> difference in our respective thinking.
>
>
> ?
> Arithmetic and the UD* contains infinitely many observers.
>
>
>
>
>     Your result that there cannot exist "a finite unique physical
> universe" in Step 8 is correct, but you are misinterpreting what
> this means, IMHO. One should not assume an absolute, Laplacean or Platonic
> version of a "physical universe" can exist
>
>
> Sure. That's part of the result.
>
>
>
> since such would be completely separated from observers and measurements
>
>
> Why?
>
>
>
> and thus not have any particular definite properties! At most it would
> have all possible properties which sums to a null set, as Russell Standish
> argued in A theory of Nothing.
>
>
> Unclear.
>
>
>
>
>   We do not need to assume any kind of primitive physical world that exist
> independent of observer, as you point out in Step 8.
>
>
> It is not that we don't need it, but that we cannot use it. Primitive
> Matter is shown being empty of any explanative power, even in physics.
>
>
>
>
> We can obtain physical worlds or "realities" by considering the
> commonalities and mutual consistent descriptions of many observers (that
> can be distinguished by observers in the "reality". Again, I am using your
> definition of an observer.
>
>    *Observers generate worlds by their participation with each other.
> Worlds support and implement computations. Computations generate new
> observers.* The circle does not close unless there is no measure of
> change (time). It is a cycle, like a helix, eternally evolving and flowing,
> not a vicious circle.
>
>
> You cannot invalidate a reasoning by working in another theory. You like
> comp, but continue to assume many things incompatible with it.
>
> Bruno
>
> I have to go now. I might answer other posts later.
>
>
>
> On Fri, Jan 17, 2014 at 1:49 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>
>>
>> On 17 Jan 2014, at 07:10, meekerdb wrote:
>>
>>  On 1/16/2014 4:55 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>>
>>>> On 13 January 2014 04:42, Telmo Menezes <te...@telmomenezes.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>  I'm a lump of dumb matter arranged in a special way and I am
>>>>>> conscious, so I don't see why another lump of dumb matter arranged in
>>>>>> a special way might not also be conscious. What is it about that idea
>>>>>> that you see as not only wrong, but ridiculous?
>>>>>>
>>>>> I'm sorry I repeat this answer so many times, but this claim is also
>>>>> made so many times. The main problem I see with this idea is that no
>>>>> progress has been made so far in explaining how a lump of matter
>>>>> becomes conscious, as opposed to just being a zombie mechanically
>>>>> performing complex behaviors. Insisting that such an explanation must
>>>>> exist instead of entertaining other models of reality strikes me as a
>>>>> form of mysticism.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>> It's speculation, just like Bruno's speculation that physics can be
>>> recovered from the UD and modal logic.
>>>
>>
>> No. UDA is a proof (or argument, as in step 8 I have to use Occam) that
>> any rational person and indeed machine can understand that if it/she/he can
>> survive with a digital brain "qua computatio", the physics can be recovered
>> from UD and the modal logic.
>>
>> the speculative covers only the "yes doctor", and the Church thesis (and
>> thus the minimal amount of arithmetic to provide a sense to Church thesis).
>>
>> Then AUDA does the job, constructively. It is an immense task, but I get
>> already the propositional level of each points of view, including the logic
>> of knowledge, observation, and sensations.
>>
>> The only problem is that things get quickly technically very difficult,
>> but the contrary would have been astonishing.
>>
>> Or you believe in a finite unique physical universe, and that step 8 does
>> not succeed in showing that it is a red herring?
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>>  It may be a problem that I'm not producing a theory of consciousness
>>>> to your satisfaction, but which part of the claim I made do you
>>>> actually disagree with?
>>>>
>>>>
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>>
>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>>
>>
>>
>>
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>
>
>
> --
>
> Kindest Regards,
>
> Stephen Paul King
>
> Senior Researcher
>
> Mobile: (864) 567-3099
>
> stephe...@provensecure.com
>
>  http://www.provensecure.us/
>
>
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> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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>
>
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-- 

Kindest Regards,

Stephen Paul King

Senior Researcher

Mobile: (864) 567-3099

stephe...@provensecure.com

 http://www.provensecure.us/


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