On 24 Jan 2014, at 14:44, Edgar L. Owen wrote:

Bruno,

The computations are NOT PHYSICAL. How many times do I have to tell you that before you get it?

I did not say that.
But you mentioned a single computational reality. What do you mean?

There is only one single computational reality, the UD*, or any sigma_1 complete reality, and this needs arithmetic (or anything Turing equivalent), and then by the UDA, the TOE ontology does not, and cannot, be more rich than that.
Then you say "
One of course needs a single computational reality for all the computational results to manifest in the same universe
I do not understand.

And you keep not answering the question "can we survive with an artificial brain" in your "theory"?

Bruno



Edgar


On Friday, January 24, 2014 3:28:00 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 23 Jan 2014, at 20:57, Edgar L. Owen wrote:

Finally I agree there is NOT just a single computation going on. I just agreed with that in my previous response. I suggested there are myriads of computations going on in a single computational reality. One of course needs a single computational reality for all the computational results to manifest in the same universe.

OK. But it does not need to be physical. In fact nobody can define "physical computation" without using the arithmetical notion. Arithmetic provides a simple realm containing all computations. The physical appearance can be (and must be, by UDA) explained from it.

1. There is a single fundamental computational reality which includes myriads of individual computations?

Yes, indeed. A tiny part of arithmetic (sigma_1 arithmetic) contains *all* possible computations. It is a consequence of Church thesis, or of Turing definition of computations.



2. This fundamental computational reality includes the attribute of becoming?

In the first person view that we can attribute to relativ
...

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