Edgar,
On 24 Jan 2014, at 17:35, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
Bruno,
Stop making the ridiculous claim that "there is only one
computational reality, the UD", as if yours was the only one that
could even be postulated.
I don't have to postulate this. It is consequence of the laws of
addition, multiplication and Church's thesis.
My computational reality is NOT the same as your 'comp', and your
conclusions obviously do not apply to mine.
Then I have missed your explanation. I don't find it.
I've explained mine in detail in a number of posts.
Can you copy and past one definition of your computational reality?
And I don't answer the question "can we survive with an artificial
brain in my theory" because it is irrelevant sci fi fantasy with all
sorts of unstated assumptions.
?
My theory deals with reality, not with sci fi.
If reality is known by you, you will have some difficulty to learn
anything.
However I've already stated the strict answer to the question as
stated and with the normal theoretical (and totally impracticable)
assumptions is 'yes, of course',
Ah!
We progress.
By saying that you can survive with an artificial brain, which I meant
a digital universal machine, you have accepted one half of the
assumption.
The second half is Church thesis, which is an important assumption in
computability theory.
I have a feeling that you might ignore it, but without it, the notion
of computation remains a non scientific notion. That does not make it
true, but the evidences that we have is that is is quite plausible. WE
can come back on this.
but so what?
so, you have done 1/2 of the step 0. If you are really interested in
"so what", you might test yourself and your theory on the following
steps, and understood the consequences, which basically assess Plato
view on reality, in opposition to Aristotle. The consequence, in a
nutshell, is that the physical reality emerges in a certain way from
elementary arithmetical truth. We get a Pythagorean form of Platonism,
with a testable theory as a gift.
It has nothing to do with the core principles of computational
reality...
It has everything to do. You can already have the gist at step 3.
If our consciousness is invariant for that digital substitution, then
we are distributed in the arithmetical reality, in a way we can test
(and already confirmed by QM (without collapse)).
Why do you keep asking this question I've already answered?
Yes, you did, incidentally. But you said it an context making it
unclear. Now that is clear.
I keep asking the question, because it has been my job to deduce the
consequences of that hypothesis, and one of them is that we have to
explain mind and physics, without any assumption on either mind nor
matter.
But I let you judge(*) by yourself, if you are really interested in
the field.
Bruno
(*) http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html
Edgar
On Friday, January 24, 2014 11:01:52 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 24 Jan 2014, at 14:44, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
Bruno,
The computations are NOT PHYSICAL. How many times do I have to tell
you that before you get it?
I did not say that.
But you mentioned a single computational reality. What do you mean?
There is only one single computational reality, the UD*, or any
sigma_1 complete reality, and this needs arithmetic (or anything
Turing equivalent), and then by the UDA, the TOE ontology does not,
and cannot, be more rich than that.
Then you say "
One of course needs a single computational reality for all the
computational results to manifest in the same universe
I do not understand.
And you keep not answering the question "can we survive with an
artificial brain" in your "theory"?
Bruno
Edgar
On Friday, January 24, 2014 3:28:00 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 23 Jan 2014, at 20:57, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
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family:Helvetica;font-style:normal;font-variant:no
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