On Thursday, January 30, 2014 4:08:31 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote: > > On 30 January 2014 16:33, Bruno Marchal <[email protected] <javascript:>>wrote: > > Not really. Somehow, you conflate levels and points of view. It is a sin >> of reductionism :) >> You do the "mistake" of those who deny compatibilistic free-will. >> >> Of course we are at the crux of the mind-body problem. >> > > Bruno, my dear and much-valued correspondent, you exasperate me sometimes > by commenting a mere step in my argument as if it were the conclusion. I > was attempting here to articulate the Paradox of Phenomenal Judgement in > its default form (i.e. assuming a primitively-physical basis) because this > is how it typically arises in the first place. Hence I meant this step of > the argument to be a kind of reductio of this position. Later in my post I > went on to say how that I think comp may avoid the paradox, which you also > commented. If you could perhaps restrain your enthusiasm and read the post > to the end before commenting, you might occasionally save yourself some > typing! Don't mean to scold, just help :) > > BTW, although you say that Craig can perhaps avoid the POPJ by appealing > to a non-comp theory, ISTM that the problem of reference is still there so > long as his "fundamental-sense" theory relies on causally-closed extrinsic > *appearances". >
If it relies on extrinsic appearances, then sense wouldn't be fundamental. I call my view of sense Primordial Identity Pansensitivity - which means that all possible phenomena are sensory experiences, including the experience of "having" experiences, or "being" a being. Causality itself supervenes on senses like memory, sequence, change, inertia, correspondence...lots of sensible infrastructure has to be in place before causality can appear. > However, under questioning he's so far been rather unclear about this > aspect of his theory. > If I am it is certainly not intentional. What does it seem like I'm unclear about? There's always my website too if you are interested: http://multisenserealism.com > Are such appearances causally closed? Do we not rely on such "physical" > consistency? > The "we" of individual human beings relies on physical consistency because that is a common sensory experience of the animal>organism>substance context. The substance context however relies on the "we" of the Absolute context. The biological context relies on those "we"s, and the animal context relies on the biological "we"s. It's all nested but the bottom of each extrinsic level is being supported by the top of the previous intrinsic level. I was trying to get at something close to that in this diagram: > <http://multisenserealism.files.wordpress.com/2013/04/shoelace.jpg> > Maybe, sometimes, who knows, whatever. I might go so far as to say that > he's been dodging the question. > > That said, if I'm even approximately right about this fundamental problem > of reference, then of theories known to me, only comp confronts the POPJ > directly. The plausible resolution of the paradox, if I've understood you, > lies in the capability of the machine to refer to non-shareable but > incorrigible truths beyond formal proof and demonstration. Then - if we are > machines - our own incontrovertible faith in, and ability to refer to, such > indexical "facts" may serve as the warrant that also delivers our fellow > machines from zombie-hood. > > David > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
