On 30 January 2014 16:33, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: Not really. Somehow, you conflate levels and points of view. It is a sin of > reductionism :) > You do the "mistake" of those who deny compatibilistic free-will. > > Of course we are at the crux of the mind-body problem. >
Bruno, my dear and much-valued correspondent, you exasperate me sometimes by commenting a mere step in my argument as if it were the conclusion. I was attempting here to articulate the Paradox of Phenomenal Judgement in its default form (i.e. assuming a primitively-physical basis) because this is how it typically arises in the first place. Hence I meant this step of the argument to be a kind of reductio of this position. Later in my post I went on to say how that I think comp may avoid the paradox, which you also commented. If you could perhaps restrain your enthusiasm and read the post to the end before commenting, you might occasionally save yourself some typing! Don't mean to scold, just help :) BTW, although you say that Craig can perhaps avoid the POPJ by appealing to a non-comp theory, ISTM that the problem of reference is still there so long as his "fundamental-sense" theory relies on causally-closed extrinsic *appearances". However, under questioning he's so far been rather unclear about this aspect of his theory. Are such appearances causally closed? Do we not rely on such "physical" consistency? Maybe, sometimes, who knows, whatever. I might go so far as to say that he's been dodging the question. That said, if I'm even approximately right about this fundamental problem of reference, then of theories known to me, only comp confronts the POPJ directly. The plausible resolution of the paradox, if I've understood you, lies in the capability of the machine to refer to non-shareable but incorrigible truths beyond formal proof and demonstration. Then - if we are machines - our own incontrovertible faith in, and ability to refer to, such indexical "facts" may serve as the warrant that also delivers our fellow machines from zombie-hood. David -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
