On Monday, February 3, 2014 3:17:46 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 02 Feb 2014, at 20:31, meekerdb wrote:
>
>  On 2/2/2014 5:37 AM, David Nyman wrote:
>  
> Craig, nothing you have said so far diminishes by a single iota the 
> significance of the paradox to your theory. It's not so easy to disarm it 
> as insouciantly interpolating armfuls of non-sequiturs couched in an 
> impenetrable private jargon. You quote Chalmers, but you consistently dodge 
> (or perhaps don't really get) the point he is making. His analysis isn't 
> merely that physics seems to make consciousness causally irrelevant, though 
> that in itself would be daunting enough. The paradoxical entailment comes 
> from confronting the stark realisation that, despite this, 
> physically-instantiated bodies and brains (i.e. the appearances in terms of 
> which we interact both with "ourselves" and with each other) continue to 
> behave *as if* they were laying claim to such conscious phenomena. 
> Furthermore, they apparently do so by means of a causally-closed mechanism 
> that entails that they neither possess these phenomena nor could plausibly 
> have any access to them. 
>
>
> But the "apparently" in the above is not apparent at all.  One could just 
> as well conclude that consciousness is a nomologically necessary aspect 
> of the causally-close physics; that it's no more separable than is 
> temperature from molecular motion.
>
>
> That analogy is limited. You can explain temperature from molecules 
> cinetics by remaining entirely in the 3p account. The mind-body problem is 
> that if you can explain the whole 3p of the 1p, then the mind seems having 
> no role at all. 
> Now with comp we take the mind seriously and can explain its necessity and 
> role (like with the hypostases), but we lost any ontic place for matter, so 
> we lost primitive physics, and we have to recover it by a statistics on the 
> 1p brought by all computations.
>
> It is not a problem (except for Aristotelian fundamentalists) because 
> nobody has ever provided evidences for primitive matter or physicalism. It 
> is only a big assumption in metaphysics.
>

Is there a good resource online which explains the eight hypostases and 
their relevance to connecting consciousness to computation? 

Craig


> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
> Brent
>
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> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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