On 04 Feb 2014, at 15:33, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Tuesday, February 4, 2014 3:57:46 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 03 Feb 2014, at 21:25, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Monday, February 3, 2014 3:17:46 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 02 Feb 2014, at 20:31, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/2/2014 5:37 AM, David Nyman wrote:
Craig, nothing you have said so far diminishes by a single iota
the significance of the paradox to your theory. It's not so easy
to disarm it as insouciantly interpolating armfuls of non-
sequiturs couched in an impenetrable private jargon. You quote
Chalmers, but you consistently dodge (or perhaps don't really
get) the point he is making. His analysis isn't merely that
physics seems to make consciousness causally irrelevant, though
that in itself would be daunting enough. The paradoxical
entailment comes from confronting the stark realisation that,
despite this, physically-instantiated bodies and brains (i.e. the
appearances in terms of which we interact both with "ourselves"
and with each other) continue to behave *as if* they were laying
claim to such conscious phenomena. Furthermore, they apparently
do so by means of a causally-closed mechanism that entails that
they neither possess these phenomena nor could plausibly have any
access to them.
But the "apparently" in the above is not apparent at all. One
could just as well conclude that consciousness is a nomologically
necessary aspect of the causally-close physics; that it's no more
separable than is temperature from molecular motion.
That analogy is limited. You can explain temperature from molecules
cinetics by remaining entirely in the 3p account. The mind-body
problem is that if you can explain the whole 3p of the 1p, then the
mind seems having no role at all.
Now with comp we take the mind seriously and can explain its
necessity and role (like with the hypostases), but we lost any
ontic place for matter, so we lost primitive physics, and we have
to recover it by a statistics on the 1p brought by all computations.
It is not a problem (except for Aristotelian fundamentalists)
because nobody has ever provided evidences for primitive matter or
physicalism. It is only a big assumption in metaphysics.
Is there a good resource online which explains the eight hypostases
and their relevance to connecting consciousness to computation?
This one, often mentioned. To get the connection with consciousness,
you need to work IN the theory comp, and assume that your
consciousness is invariant for digital brain substitution (at some
level). Then the self-reference theory redo an abstract form of the
UDA in arithmetic.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html
Thanks, but I am looking at more of a Wikipedia-level explanation
rather than a logician's diagram. No offense, it looks cool.
Well, there are the 700 pages quasi-self contained version and the
original thesis, but it is in french.
Ah, an exposition of the UDA is also here, by someone who sometimes
participates here, Pierz:
http://clubofsc.blogspot.be/2011/08/my-topic-universal-dovetailer-argument.html
But the math part is both a very long work, then suddenly made short
thanks to a theorem of Solovay, but of course short is not necessarily
more easier, as it presupposes a familiarity with Gödel, Löb and many
results in mathematical logic and theoretical computer science.
Bruno
Craig
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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