On Tuesday, February 4, 2014 3:57:46 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 03 Feb 2014, at 21:25, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > On Monday, February 3, 2014 3:17:46 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 02 Feb 2014, at 20:31, meekerdb wrote: >> >> On 2/2/2014 5:37 AM, David Nyman wrote: >> >> Craig, nothing you have said so far diminishes by a single iota the >> significance of the paradox to your theory. It's not so easy to disarm it >> as insouciantly interpolating armfuls of non-sequiturs couched in an >> impenetrable private jargon. You quote Chalmers, but you consistently dodge >> (or perhaps don't really get) the point he is making. His analysis isn't >> merely that physics seems to make consciousness causally irrelevant, though >> that in itself would be daunting enough. The paradoxical entailment comes >> from confronting the stark realisation that, despite this, >> physically-instantiated bodies and brains (i.e. the appearances in terms of >> which we interact both with "ourselves" and with each other) continue to >> behave *as if* they were laying claim to such conscious phenomena. >> Furthermore, they apparently do so by means of a causally-closed mechanism >> that entails that they neither possess these phenomena nor could plausibly >> have any access to them. >> >> >> But the "apparently" in the above is not apparent at all. One could just >> as well conclude that consciousness is a nomologically necessary aspect >> of the causally-close physics; that it's no more separable than is >> temperature from molecular motion. >> >> >> That analogy is limited. You can explain temperature from molecules >> cinetics by remaining entirely in the 3p account. The mind-body problem is >> that if you can explain the whole 3p of the 1p, then the mind seems having >> no role at all. >> Now with comp we take the mind seriously and can explain its necessity >> and role (like with the hypostases), but we lost any ontic place for >> matter, so we lost primitive physics, and we have to recover it by a >> statistics on the 1p brought by all computations. >> >> It is not a problem (except for Aristotelian fundamentalists) because >> nobody has ever provided evidences for primitive matter or physicalism. It >> is only a big assumption in metaphysics. >> > > Is there a good resource online which explains the eight hypostases and > their relevance to connecting consciousness to computation? > > > This one, often mentioned. To get the connection with consciousness, you > need to work IN the theory comp, and assume that your consciousness is > invariant for digital brain substitution (at some level). Then the > self-reference theory redo an abstract form of the UDA in arithmetic. > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html >
Thanks, but I am looking at more of a Wikipedia-level explanation rather than a logician's diagram. No offense, it looks cool. Craig > > Bruno > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
