On Tuesday, February 4, 2014 2:31:36 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 04 Feb 2014, at 15:33, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > On Tuesday, February 4, 2014 3:57:46 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 03 Feb 2014, at 21:25, Craig Weinberg wrote: >> >> >> >> On Monday, February 3, 2014 3:17:46 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 02 Feb 2014, at 20:31, meekerdb wrote: >>> >>> On 2/2/2014 5:37 AM, David Nyman wrote: >>> >>> Craig, nothing you have said so far diminishes by a single iota the >>> significance of the paradox to your theory. It's not so easy to disarm it >>> as insouciantly interpolating armfuls of non-sequiturs couched in an >>> impenetrable private jargon. You quote Chalmers, but you consistently dodge >>> (or perhaps don't really get) the point he is making. His analysis isn't >>> merely that physics seems to make consciousness causally irrelevant, though >>> that in itself would be daunting enough. The paradoxical entailment comes >>> from confronting the stark realisation that, despite this, >>> physically-instantiated bodies and brains (i.e. the appearances in terms of >>> which we interact both with "ourselves" and with each other) continue to >>> behave *as if* they were laying claim to such conscious phenomena. >>> Furthermore, they apparently do so by means of a causally-closed mechanism >>> that entails that they neither possess these phenomena nor could plausibly >>> have any access to them. >>> >>> >>> But the "apparently" in the above is not apparent at all. One could >>> just as well conclude that consciousness is a nomologically necessaryaspect >>> of the causally-close physics; that it's no more separable than is >>> temperature from molecular motion. >>> >>> >>> That analogy is limited. You can explain temperature from molecules >>> cinetics by remaining entirely in the 3p account. The mind-body problem is >>> that if you can explain the whole 3p of the 1p, then the mind seems having >>> no role at all. >>> Now with comp we take the mind seriously and can explain its necessity >>> and role (like with the hypostases), but we lost any ontic place for >>> matter, so we lost primitive physics, and we have to recover it by a >>> statistics on the 1p brought by all computations. >>> >>> It is not a problem (except for Aristotelian fundamentalists) because >>> nobody has ever provided evidences for primitive matter or physicalism. It >>> is only a big assumption in metaphysics. >>> >> >> Is there a good resource online which explains the eight hypostases and >> their relevance to connecting consciousness to computation? >> >> >> This one, often mentioned. To get the connection with consciousness, you >> need to work IN the theory comp, and assume that your consciousness is >> invariant for digital brain substitution (at some level). Then the >> self-reference theory redo an abstract form of the UDA in arithmetic. >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html >> > > Thanks, but I am looking at more of a Wikipedia-level explanation rather > than a logician's diagram. No offense, it looks cool. > > > > Well, there are the 700 pages quasi-self contained version and the > original thesis, but it is in french. > > Ah, an exposition of the UDA is also here, by someone who sometimes > participates here, Pierz: > > > http://clubofsc.blogspot.be/2011/08/my-topic-universal-dovetailer-argument.html > > But the math part is both a very long work, then suddenly made short > thanks to a theorem of Solovay, but of course short is not necessarily more > easier, as it presupposes a familiarity with Gödel, Löb and many results > in mathematical logic and theoretical computer science. >
So there is no non-technical description or overview of the 8 hypostases. > > Bruno > > > > > > > Craig > > >> >> Bruno >> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] <javascript:>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]<javascript:> > . > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
