On 03 Feb 2014, at 21:25, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Monday, February 3, 2014 3:17:46 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 02 Feb 2014, at 20:31, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/2/2014 5:37 AM, David Nyman wrote:
Craig, nothing you have said so far diminishes by a single iota
the significance of the paradox to your theory. It's not so easy
to disarm it as insouciantly interpolating armfuls of non-
sequiturs couched in an impenetrable private jargon. You quote
Chalmers, but you consistently dodge (or perhaps don't really get)
the point he is making. His analysis isn't merely that physics
seems to make consciousness causally irrelevant, though that in
itself would be daunting enough. The paradoxical entailment comes
from confronting the stark realisation that, despite this,
physically-instantiated bodies and brains (i.e. the appearances in
terms of which we interact both with "ourselves" and with each
other) continue to behave *as if* they were laying claim to such
conscious phenomena. Furthermore, they apparently do so by means
of a causally-closed mechanism that entails that they neither
possess these phenomena nor could plausibly have any access to them.
But the "apparently" in the above is not apparent at all. One
could just as well conclude that consciousness is a nomologically
necessary aspect of the causally-close physics; that it's no more
separable than is temperature from molecular motion.
That analogy is limited. You can explain temperature from molecules
cinetics by remaining entirely in the 3p account. The mind-body
problem is that if you can explain the whole 3p of the 1p, then the
mind seems having no role at all.
Now with comp we take the mind seriously and can explain its
necessity and role (like with the hypostases), but we lost any ontic
place for matter, so we lost primitive physics, and we have to
recover it by a statistics on the 1p brought by all computations.
It is not a problem (except for Aristotelian fundamentalists)
because nobody has ever provided evidences for primitive matter or
physicalism. It is only a big assumption in metaphysics.
Is there a good resource online which explains the eight hypostases
and their relevance to connecting consciousness to computation?
This one, often mentioned. To get the connection with consciousness,
you need to work IN the theory comp, and assume that your
consciousness is invariant for digital brain substitution (at some
level). Then the self-reference theory redo an abstract form of the
UDA in arithmetic.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
