On 05 Feb 2014, at 23:36, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/5/2014 2:10 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 04 Feb 2014, at 18:32, meekerdb wrote:
...
I have criticized it for it's seeming lack of predictive power - a
problem with all theories of everythingism so far, and also string
theory.
That is a technical issue only. As comp has to predict or re-
predict all of physics, it is hardly not predictive. In particular,
comp + Theaetetus already provide the logic of the observable, and
up to now, it fits with the facts.
Well it's no good saying it *must be* predictive - if it's true.
That is the non trivial consequence comp. It is the sense of "deriving
physics from arithmetic".
All rules of prediction about the observable reality *have to* be
theorems in arithmetic, concerning bets by universal machines.
One can say that about many theories - including string theory.
OK. But string theory like QM have been build for doing that. Comp is
just the idea that the brain is a machine, and the consequence is that
the laws of physics are given by the relative measure on universal
machine/numbers states.
With comp, physics = the laws of the universal machine observable,
with observable defined by an indexical (like []p &p, or the others, p
sigma_1 proposition).
Bruno
Brent
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