On 4 February 2014 20:20, Craig Weinberg <[email protected]> wrote:
> > On Tuesday, February 4, 2014 2:56:05 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote: > >> On 4 February 2014 18:04, Craig Weinberg <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> >>> On Tuesday, February 4, 2014 12:57:45 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote: >>> >>>> On 4 February 2014 17:32, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>> I don't think there's anything wrong with criticizing a theory on >>>>> something other than "it's own terms". I think Craig might accept Bruno's >>>>> argument as valid but regard it as a reductio against saying "yes" to the >>>>> doctor. I have criticized it for it's seeming lack of predictive power - >>>>> a >>>>> problem with all theories of everythingism so far, and also string theory. >>>> >>>> >>>> But surely a reductio entails accepting an argument in principle and >>>> then showing that it leads to a contradiction in its own terms? The MGA, or >>>> Maudlin's argument, are of such a form (whether or not you agree they >>>> succeed). Craig has already said that he accepts the form of Bruno's >>>> argument, but not its premise: i.e. what is entailed by the acceptance of a >>>> digital brain substitution. This is certainly saying no to the doctor, but >>>> it's more like the opposite of a reductio. It's just a bald assertion that >>>> any possible success of the argument isn't worth the cost of accepting the >>>> premise. >>>> >>> >>> Yes! Because the cost is infinite. Since there is no substitute for >>> experience, there can never be anything more impossible than the idea of >>> simulating experience itself. >>> >> >> But that is not what is proposed, indeed it would be a contradiction in >> terms. >> > > Proposed by whom? Why would it be a contradiction? It is the beginning > assumption, so there is nothing to contradict. > What's not to understand? 1) Proposed by you in the sentence immediately above my comment. 2) The "simulation" of experience would be a contradiction in terms. > > >> Experience is the only indubitable reality; to talk of "simulating" it is >> equivalent to eliminating that reality (as in "it's all an illusion") and >> is just incoherent. Experience either is or it isn't and this is >> determinable only in the first-person. But it is not experience that is >> substituted, it is the device that allows that experience to manifest >> locally in terms of a particular actuality. >> > > You are assuming that the device is outside of experience. I am saying > that the device is already (nothing but) an experiential phenomenon to > begin with. There is no possibility of 'either experience is or it isn't' - > there can be no 'it isn't', not even hypothetically in an imaginary > universe. > I am assuming nothing of the sort. According to comp the device is a manifestation in experience, as I said already below, but very far from an arbitrary one. And my remark that experience is or isn't was simply an amplification of my point that experience can't be simulated. Is or isn't are the logical alternatives and we agree that the a posteriori facts determine that it is. And in any case I was commenting your statement that you reject comp at the outset because "Since there is no substitute for experience, there can never be anything more impossible than the idea of simulating experience itself.". I'm trying to illustrate that this is not what comp entails and this involves following the comp argument in its own terms, not substituting an alternative theory in the middle. > >> Remember that the proposition is that experience is *invariant* for a >> digital substitution. >> > > Digits can't have an experience. Nothing that digits do can cause an > experience. Given an experience, digital analogs can of course be used to > change that experience, but by themselves, they cannot 'do' anything or > even 'be' digits. > Nobody is claiming that digits can have or cause an experience; that would be absurd. The claim is that persons have experience. Comp is an argument that the integers, with the relations of addition and multiplication, (or any equivalent Turing-complete system) provide an ontology powerful enough to furnish a derivation of persons for whom a truth-domain exists, in terms of which incontrovertible personal actualities are directly accessible. According to comp, therefore, that truth-domain and those actualities *are* the experiences that both you and I find so uniquely indubitable. Not digits. This is a surprising claim but it is based on a coherent argument which (when understood rather than turned into gibberish) can be criticised and potentially falsified. But it is in no sense, as you seem to believe on the basis, apparently, of nothing but your gut instinct, a priori impossible. > >> The UDA is a step-wise argument for the view that this makes sense only >> if physics itself is the result of a statistical filtration (the FPI) over >> the entire computational domain. Hence that local "device" is also a >> statistical-derived appearance stabilised by this filtration. >> > > I'm saying that arithmetic truth in total is a filtration of more > primitive sensory-motive phenomena. Math = sensible filtration of sense. > You can place computation on a more primitive base if you wish, but if the digital prosthesis were successful, the comp argument would show that this wouldn't make any difference to the outcome. Step 8 of the UDA (the MGA), if not disproved - or even an appeal to parsimony - shows that no putatively "more fundamental" base for computation, whether we were to call it sense, matter or cosmic spaghetti, would make any difference to the comp ontology or epistemology. > > >> >>> >>>> That could indeed turn out to be the case, but it isn't in itself an >>>> argument. >>>> >>> >>> The truth of physics and sense is not an argument, argument is a >>> comparison within sense. Why does the universe have to fit into an argument >>> of cognitive human logic? Let the universe be what it is - perception. >>> Participation. Aesthetic acquaintance on many nested (and sometimes >>> ambiguously so) levels. >>> >> >> What alternative could we possibly have to "letting the universe be what >> it is"? >> > > We could shoehorn it into a mechanemorphic theory of information or an > anthropomorphic icon of metaphor. > Only metaphorically, I presume. > > >> But whether the universe (i.e. what we can only guess at) simply "is" >> perception, or has a more complex relation with it, >> > > The more complex relation would also be a perception, an experience. > Yes, according to your theory, but not according to comp. Point out what I'm missing by all means, but what I see is just a series of counter-assertions, not a counter-argument. If your response to any aspect of the comp argument is just to propose an alternative formulation of your own, then this can only be an echo-chamber, not a discussion. I'm not trying to prove *your* theory wrong, I'm just doing my (poor) best to elucidate what I think are your misunderstandings of comp. > > >> is not something that either you or I could possibly know a priori, or >> even a posteriori. >> > > Knowing is not the goal. Understanding is. > Deep. > > >> We - our experiential selves - are virtual creatures who can only "bet" >> on an ultimate reality from the perspective of what is, for us, an >> indubitable, though unshareable, indexical actuality. The reasons for that >> very indubitability and unshareability, moreover, are predictable in terms >> of the comp argument. >> > > But comp cannot predict anything about the nature of 1p, or even that > there could be a such thing as a feeling or perception - only that there > are some gaps through which machines behave as if they are able to make > bets that are correct. > That is untrue. The principal prediction that comp makes with respect to feeling or perception is that the persons derivable within the comp schema would make the same truth-claims to possessing feelings and perceptions as do you or I. This is even a moral insight, since it means we either treat these truth-claims as seriously as our own, or in the foreseeable future we are likely to be guilty of a new species of racial prejudice. The fact that we will have only their behaviour to go on is no different than our position vis-a-vis one another. Of course the "ultimate" nature of those feelings and perceptions is unshareable, but that too is justifiable and predictable in comp. There is no theory that I am aware of that can close that final unshareable gap, even in principle. > But of course the universe doesn't have to - and never will - "fit into >> an argument of cognitive human logic". But neither should we expect it to >> fit with any other human predilection-du-jour, be that aesthetic, >> orouboran, tessellated, or whatever else. These too are merely >> speculations, or wagers, and must stand or fall on the same criteria of >> generality, coherence, and explanatory and predictive power. >> > > Then you are a priori ruling out that the universe could defy your > expectations of being able to fit into your criteria. > Is that supposed to be serious? Please stop playing silly verbal games like this. > The truth of the universe does not have to be something that makes it > convenient to make predictions, and even if it did, you have no idea what > the framework that I propose could yield or contribute. I don't see any > reason why the sense-first view is any less explanatory or predictive than > the notion of relativity or heliocentric astronomy. > Where have I suggested this? I have just asked you some relevant questions to which I hoped to receive informative answers. There is rarely time to make a complete study of any theory. I assumed that discussing and answering questions about your ideas was one of the reasons you participate on this list. Sure, you would have to do some tricky experimentation, but that doesn't > mean that there must be some other theory which will get us there without > considering the sense-first model. > No, it doesn't. David > >> >>> >>> Craig >>> >>> >>>> >>>> Your own criticism, by contrast, can only succeed by accepting the >>>> argument in its own terms and then showing that in this form it fails to >>>> satisfy certain desirable criteria, such as predictive power. That's not a >>>> reductio either, although of course it's a perfectly valid objection to >>>> raise. >>>> >>>> David >>>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>> >> >> -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
