On 04 Feb 2014, at 21:20, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Tuesday, February 4, 2014 2:56:05 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote:
On 4 February 2014 18:04, Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com> wrote:
On Tuesday, February 4, 2014 12:57:45 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote:
On 4 February 2014 17:32, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:
I don't think there's anything wrong with criticizing a theory on
something other than "it's own terms". I think Craig might accept
Bruno's argument as valid but regard it as a reductio against saying
"yes" to the doctor. I have criticized it for it's seeming lack of
predictive power - a problem with all theories of everythingism so
far, and also string theory.
But surely a reductio entails accepting an argument in principle and
then showing that it leads to a contradiction in its own terms? The
MGA, or Maudlin's argument, are of such a form (whether or not you
agree they succeed). Craig has already said that he accepts the form
of Bruno's argument, but not its premise: i.e. what is entailed by
the acceptance of a digital brain substitution. This is certainly
saying no to the doctor, but it's more like the opposite of a
reductio. It's just a bald assertion that any possible success of
the argument isn't worth the cost of accepting the premise.
Yes! Because the cost is infinite. Since there is no substitute for
experience, there can never be anything more impossible than the
idea of simulating experience itself.
But that is not what is proposed, indeed it would be a contradiction
in terms.
Proposed by whom? Why would it be a contradiction? It is the
beginning assumption, so there is nothing to contradict.
But you must show that the beginning assumption is contradictory. You
cannot just say "I feel that it is obvious that it is contradictory".
Experience is the only indubitable reality; to talk of "simulating"
it is equivalent to eliminating that reality (as in "it's all an
illusion") and is just incoherent. Experience either is or it isn't
and this is determinable only in the first-person. But it is not
experience that is substituted, it is the device that allows that
experience to manifest locally in terms of a particular actuality.
You are assuming that the device is outside of experience. I am
saying that the device is already (nothing but) an experiential
phenomenon to begin with. There is no possibility of 'either
experience is or it isn't' - there can be no 'it isn't', not even
hypothetically in an imaginary universe.
Remember that the proposition is that experience is *invariant* for
a digital substitution.
Digits can't have an experience.
OK.
Nothing that digits do can cause an experience.
Digits cannot send mail, but organized digits relatively to some
Turing universal environment can.
Your "induction" is just invalidated.
None of the parts of my computer can do anything, but their overall
structured organization can.
No numbers has any self-reference ability per se, but they can all
have one when considered in relation with universal numbers, etc.
Given an experience, digital analogs can of course be used to change
that experience, but by themselves, they cannot 'do' anything or
even 'be' digits.
The UDA is a step-wise argument for the view that this makes sense
only if physics itself is the result of a statistical filtration
(the FPI) over the entire computational domain. Hence that local
"device" is also a statistical-derived appearance stabilised by this
filtration.
I'm saying that arithmetic truth in total is a filtration of more
primitive sensory-motive phenomena. Math = sensible filtration of
sense.
Saying is not enough. you must argue for this. My feeling is that you
have still a pre-Turing-Gödel conception of machine and numbers. Today
we no more, in the sense that we know that we know less on them that
we thought.
That could indeed turn out to be the case, but it isn't in itself an
argument.
The truth of physics and sense is not an argument, argument is a
comparison within sense. Why does the universe have to fit into an
argument of cognitive human logic? Let the universe be what it is -
perception. Participation. Aesthetic acquaintance on many nested
(and sometimes ambiguously so) levels.
What alternative could we possibly have to "letting the universe be
what it is"?
We could shoehorn it into a mechanemorphic theory of information or
an anthropomorphic icon of metaphor.
But whether the universe (i.e. what we can only guess at) simply
"is" perception, or has a more complex relation with it,
The more complex relation would also be a perception, an experience.
is not something that either you or I could possibly know a priori,
or even a posteriori.
Knowing is not the goal. Understanding is.
We - our experiential selves - are virtual creatures who can only
"bet" on an ultimate reality from the perspective of what is, for
us, an indubitable, though unshareable, indexical actuality. The
reasons for that very indubitability and unshareability, moreover,
are predictable in terms of the comp argument.
But comp cannot predict anything about the nature of 1p, or even
that there could be a such thing as a feeling or perception - only
that there are some gaps through which machines behave as if they
are able to make bets that are correct.
That critics is often done, even by logicians, who believe that I use
only the G/G* difference, but feeling are not explain only by that
gap, but by the corresponding gap on the intensional variants of G and
G*. That is Z1* - Z1, X1* - X1.
More on this in the modal threads.
(Quite amazingly S4Grz* - S4Grz = empty! It makes the soul of the
machine truth complete from its perspective. The soul and God agrees
completely on the soul's logic).
But of course the universe doesn't have to - and never will - "fit
into an argument of cognitive human logic". But neither should we
expect it to fit with any other human predilection-du-jour, be that
aesthetic, orouboran, tessellated, or whatever else. These too are
merely speculations, or wagers, and must stand or fall on the same
criteria of generality, coherence, and explanatory and predictive
power.
Then you are a priori ruling out that the universe could defy your
expectations of being able to fit into your criteria.
That does not follow what David said.
But we cannot assume at the start that the universe or consciousness
will not fit a theory. We have just to be precise enough in the theory
so that we can see if the universe fits the theory or not.
The truth of the universe does not have to be something that makes
it convenient to make predictions, and even if it did, you have no
idea what the framework that I propose could yield or contribute. I
don't see any reason why the sense-first view is any less
explanatory or predictive than the notion of relativity or
heliocentric astronomy. Sure, you would have to do some tricky
experimentation, but that doesn't mean that there must be some other
theory which will get us there without considering the sense-first
model.
You can develop your theory, but the existence of your theory cannot
invalidate comp, as it assumes comp false at the beginning, and this
without any argument which has not been able to be shown to not beg
the question.
Bruno
Craig
David
Craig
Your own criticism, by contrast, can only succeed by accepting the
argument in its own terms and then showing that in this form it
fails to satisfy certain desirable criteria, such as predictive
power. That's not a reductio either, although of course it's a
perfectly valid objection to raise.
David
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