On 11 Feb 2014, at 04:40, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/10/2014 7:15 PM, LizR wrote:
On 11 February 2014 15:59, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:
On 2/10/2014 5:35 PM, LizR wrote:
On 11 February 2014 13:42, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:
On 2/10/2014 1:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 10 Feb 2014, at 06:08, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/9/2014 12:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Even on his argument, that nobody understand but him, against
step 3? Then I invite you to attempt to explain it to us.
I think I understand it. Asking the question "which will you
be" in the MW experiment is ambiguous because "you" is duplicated.
But that question is John Clark's invention. I never ask it. The
question asked is about your FIRST PERSON expectation about 1-
your future. It cannot be ambiguous when we assume comp.
Sure it is. What does "your first person expectation" refer to.
Does it ask what will your 1-p experience be? Or does it ask what
is your 1-p feeling about where you will be?
Consider a quantum measurement instead. Do we have an expectation
of 1p experience when we check if a photon's been reflected or
transmitted? We assign a probability to each outcome, surely? Why
is Bruno's duplicator different?
There are two different people you can ask, "How did the experiment
come out."
Well, likewise with the quantum version. In fact there are two
versions of you who can ask them (i.e. if you accept the MWI,
what's the problem?)
(We seem to have been around in a loop on this about 100 times...)
I agree and I'm willing to take it as hypothetical that it doesn't
make a difference, at least till I understand the whole argument.
But I suspect that it could. It might require that in step a whole
world be created and that I think could make a difference.
The point is that if we take the assumptions of comp, then quantum
duplication, hypothetical matter transmitter duplication, and
living from day to day ALL involve the same amount of (or lack of)
continuity.
In other words, all types of existence appear to be equally
"Heraclitean" and I'm not sure why Bruno's thought experiment
should be treated any differently to the nonduplicated and the
quantum-duplicated versions. He's just using it to point out the
somewhat disjointed nature of normal existence by putting it into a
hypothetical situation where we can more easily think about the
consequences.
The claimed consequence is that consciousness can be instantiated by
a computation which requires no physical events.
In the 3-1 view, your consciousness (1p) should be associated to an
infinity of states, those equivalent (from your 1p view) in the
infinity of different computations going through that state, in the
whole UD*, or in the whole set of sigma_1 consequences of Robinson
Arithmetic. Consciousness might be "instantiated" *only* by the
infinities of the relative states in arithmetic.
That would explain the quantum-Everett multiplication, which prevents
comp from being solipsist, also.
But I think what is shown is that there can be a world including
conscious beings which does not require physical events in our
world, i.e. they can be merely arithmetical or Turing machince
"events". In other words it is possible to simulate a world with
conscious beings.
OK, but their consciousness is not simulated, as the consciousness of
the being is in all arithmetical simulations. The machine you build
makes only that consciousness manifestable relatively to you.
But that's not so surprising and doesn't imply that physics in this
world is derivative from arithmetic (but it doesn't imply the
contrary either).
Er well ... Then there is a flaw in the UDA.
It's all very well having reservations that X might make a
difference, but as Bruno keeps saying, show him where he's gone
wrong so he can stop worrying about comp and spend his time keeping
bees instead!
And I keep saying show me a significant prediction (not
retrodiction) of comp.
Liz gave a good answer.
Comp is not proposed as an answer, but as a problem, and even a
sequences of problems. It is illuminating as the problems can be made
more and more precise and this gives flashes on a different but still
rational way to conceive "reality".
What Everett did for the quantum universal wave, we can do that on any
universal system, and comp predicts that this will always give the
same physics.
If the physical laws are really laws they don't depend on the "base"
used to define the phi_i.
From a physicist point of view, computationalism suggests a new deep
invariant, universality, and its conservation law (perhaps of the 1p
or consciousness).
Keep in mind that I searched a TOE which don't put the mind under the
rug. With comp, this becomes: don't put your infinitely many
consistent extension in arithmetic under the rug.
Bruno
Brent
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