On 13 Feb 2014, at 09:44, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2014-02-13 9:32 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>:
On 12 Feb 2014, at 21:47, LizR wrote:
On 13 February 2014 09:18, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
On 12 Feb 2014, at 18:58, meekerdb wrote:
That doesn't follow. If there are disjoint worlds, as
contemplated in some versions of cosmology, they may have
different physics.
Nice, comp predicts that this is impossible, although I can agree
this is a matter of semantics, as I define a physical laws to be
true for all universal machines, so disjoint worlds will have only
different geographies.
So you're saying that only those worlds with observers in exist,
according to comp?
Not completely, as you will still have all the computations
approximating all possible geographical reality, including those
without observers, and in that sense, those "realities" exist, but
they might not be first person plural sharable, and if you could
explore one, they can violate our physics below our substitution
level (which witnesses the infinitely many computations, something
that one computation can only approximate). Your question can depend
if a quantum universal dovetailer win the "a measure battle", so
that the computations going through you states are asspciated to
some precise subdovetailing, for example.
So the physics they observe will necessarily be such that it allows
them to exist? (In other words, the "Strong Anthropic Principle" ?)
Is that not tautological?
If so, how do you account for us being able to observe an early
universe in which there were apparently no observers? Or do we as
obsverers create it (somehow) ?
We select them. See above.
You seem to be making your claim a tautology by saying whatever
your theory produces is physics, even if it's not any physics we
know of. That makes it impossible to test.
Why, the physics we get is non trivial. It is as much testable than
evolution. It explains where the laws of physics come from, and
much more. It is extremely testable, given that it gives the laws,
and it is enough to find one natural phenomenon contradicting Z1*
or X1* to refute comp (+ Theaetetus). But this needs more on
"AUDA", so let us not anticipate everything too much quickly. You
jump from step 3 to step 8, and then to AUDA. Well, it is
interesting, but like Liz said, we have to do the dinner and that
kind of things of life, if we want to continue the discussion in
decent condition.
I must admit I got that impression - thath the answer was something
like "comp predicts whatever physics we've got!"
This is false. A priori comp predicts white noise and white rabbits.
But thanks to Gödel, we know that self-reference put constraints on
what we can observe ([]p & <>t), so comp(+Theaetetus) is not
refuted yet, and is the only theory explaining where matter and
consciousness comes from. Comp predicts one precise physics, in a
way which indeed does not depend at all from what we observe in
nature (we assume *only* comp!), and so we can compare the comp-
physics with nature physics, and test comp.
I don't understand how you would disprove comp like that... because
whatever you could measure about reality could just be
"geographical" and so comp is always in accordance with whatever
measure... if not, could you precisely point on a specific thing
that would invalidate comp ?
If all the "hypostases" (points of view) modalities were collapsing
into CPL, then comp would predict that, indeed, there are no physical
laws, and everything would be geographical. This would predict that we
can "travel" in the universe/multiverse, and observe anything
logically consistent.
This would made Smullyan correct when he says, in "Forever
Undecided" (page 47):
"The physical sciences are interested in the state of affairs that
holds for the actual world, whereas pure mathematics and logic study
all possible state of affairs".
Now, we could criticize this already from observation. Indeed it is
those observations which led us to believe that there are physical
laws, and laws means that something is true everywhere in our universe
(or should means that, if that set is not empty). Indeed we believe
that F=ma, or F= KmM/r^2 are laws, that is are true, not only
everywhere, but even in all branch of the universal wave.
But comp justifies this: the modalities of provability and observation
does not collapse, and so there are universal (in a strong sense) laws
or physical truth. Among those already predicted by comp, is the Many-
worlds aspect of reality, which appears under the substitution level,
and the existence of indeterminacy and non-cloning. In particular,
without QM, I would probably tend to believe that comp is not plausible.
But comp gives the whole mathematics of observability, which leads to
infinitely many testable propositions. For example, a form of Bell's
inequality can be described in the logic Z1*, and, well, it is still
open if Z1* violates it. (because it is intractable, despite the fact
that Z1* is decidable, but it would be miraculous that Z1* proves it,
for some reason to lengthy to develop here). But the point is that if
Z1* proves that Bell inequality, then the fact that nature violates it
would refute comp. Z1* (and/or S4Grz1, X1*) is (are) supposed to
formalize the entire quantum logic, so we can compare directly the
quantum logics and the quantum logic of comp.
Some hope comes from a paper by Rawling and Selesnick(*), which use
quantum logic, and even the modal logic B, which is the modal form of
quantum logic (by a result due to Goldblatt), to implement a quantum
NOR. All this can be tested in Z1*, and normally we can test the
existence of quantum computation in Z1* (or in his quantified
extension qZ1*). Imagine that someone can prove that qZ1* cannot
emulate a quantum computer, and imagine we succeed in implementing a
quantum computation, then comp (+ Theaetetus) is refuted.
Yesterday (!), I have been sent new papers on quantum logic, which
shows that the field has progressed, notably with respect of quantum
computing, and this suggest that the best way to refute comp, or
improve the knowledge theory, will come from the ability of qS4Grz1,
or qZ1*, or qX1*, to simulate a quantum computer.
Bruno
(*) J. P. Rawling and S. A. Selesnick. Orthologic and Quantum Logic :
Models and Computational
Elements. Journal of the ACM, 47(4) :721-751, 2000.
Regards,
Quentin
However I see that isn't so, so I will be interested to know how
it's testable - if I ever make it to understanding AUDA.
I hope to be able to explain enough so that you understand the main
line on this.
Meanwhile, more explanation, notably in my answer to Brent.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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