2014-02-13 11:52 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>: > > On 13 Feb 2014, at 09:44, Quentin Anciaux wrote: > > > > > 2014-02-13 9:32 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>: > >> >> On 12 Feb 2014, at 21:47, LizR wrote: >> >> On 13 February 2014 09:18, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> On 12 Feb 2014, at 18:58, meekerdb wrote: >>> >>> That doesn't follow. If there are disjoint worlds, as contemplated in >>> some versions of cosmology, they may have different physics. >>> >>> Nice, comp predicts that this is impossible, although I can agree this >>> is a matter of semantics, as I define a physical laws to be true for all >>> universal machines, so disjoint worlds will have only different geographies. >>> >> >> So you're saying that only those worlds with observers in exist, >> according to comp? >> >> >> Not completely, as you will still have all the computations approximating >> all possible geographical reality, including those without observers, and >> in that sense, those "realities" exist, but they might not be first person >> plural sharable, and if you could explore one, they can violate our physics >> below our substitution level (which witnesses the infinitely many >> computations, something that one computation can only approximate). Your >> question can depend if a quantum universal dovetailer win the "a measure >> battle", so that the computations going through you states are asspciated >> to some precise subdovetailing, for example. >> >> >> >> >> So the physics they observe will necessarily be such that it allows them >> to exist? (In other words, the "Strong Anthropic Principle" ?) >> >> >> Is that not tautological? >> >> >> >> If so, how do you account for us being able to observe an early universe >> in which there were apparently no observers? Or do we as obsverers create >> it (somehow) ? >> >> >> We select them. See above. >> >> >> >> >> You seem to be making your claim a tautology by saying whatever your >>> theory produces is physics, even if it's not any physics we know of. That >>> makes it impossible to test. >>> >>> Why, the physics we get is non trivial. It is as much testable than >>> evolution. It explains where the laws of physics come from, and much more. >>> It is extremely testable, given that it gives the laws, and it is enough to >>> find one natural phenomenon contradicting Z1* or X1* to refute comp (+ >>> Theaetetus). But this needs more on "AUDA", so let us not anticipate >>> everything too much quickly. You jump from step 3 to step 8, and then to >>> AUDA. Well, it is interesting, but like Liz said, we have to do the dinner >>> and that kind of things of life, if we want to continue the discussion in >>> decent condition. >>> >>> I must admit I got that impression - thath the answer was something like >> "comp predicts whatever physics we've got!" >> >> >> This is false. A priori comp predicts white noise and white rabbits. But >> thanks to Gödel, we know that self-reference put constraints on what we can >> observe ([]p & <>t), so comp(+Theaetetus) is not refuted yet, and is the >> only theory explaining where matter and consciousness comes from. Comp >> predicts one precise physics, in a way which indeed does not depend at all >> from what we observe in nature (we assume *only* comp!), and so we can >> compare the comp-physics with nature physics, and test comp. >> > > I don't understand how you would disprove comp like that... because > whatever you could measure about reality could just be "geographical" and > so comp is always in accordance with whatever measure... if not, could you > precisely point on a specific thing that would invalidate comp ? > > > If all the "hypostases" (points of view) modalities were collapsing into > CPL, then comp would predict that, indeed, there are no physical laws, and > everything would be geographical. This would predict that we can "travel" > in the universe/multiverse, and observe anything logically consistent. > > This would made Smullyan correct when he says, in "Forever Undecided" > (page 47): > > "The physical sciences are interested in the state of affairs that holds > for the actual world, whereas pure mathematics and logic study all possible > state of affairs". > > Now, we could criticize this already from observation. Indeed it is those > observations which led us to believe that there are physical laws, and laws > means that something is true everywhere in our universe (or should means > that, if that set is not empty). Indeed we believe that F=ma, or F= KmM/r^2 > are laws, that is are true, not only everywhere, but even in all branch of > the universal wave. >
But it can't be true everywhere with comp, because, I can write a virtual world where this does not hold, and as it is a virtual world, an infinity of computations approximate it at any level in the UD deployement (like our reality).... hence, that "virtual" world is as real as ours by UDA (and not so virtual)... hence F=ma cannot be universaly true if comp is true. Quentin > > But comp justifies this: the modalities of provability and observation > does not collapse, and so there are universal (in a strong sense) laws or > physical truth. Among those already predicted by comp, is the Many-worlds > aspect of reality, which appears under the substitution level, and the > existence of indeterminacy and non-cloning. In particular, without QM, I > would probably tend to believe that comp is not plausible. > > But comp gives the whole mathematics of observability, which leads to > infinitely many testable propositions. For example, a form of Bell's > inequality can be described in the logic Z1*, and, well, it is still open > if Z1* violates it. (because it is intractable, despite the fact that Z1* > is decidable, but it would be miraculous that Z1* proves it, for some > reason to lengthy to develop here). But the point is that if Z1* proves > that Bell inequality, then the fact that nature violates it would refute > comp. Z1* (and/or S4Grz1, X1*) is (are) supposed to formalize the entire > quantum logic, so we can compare directly the quantum logics and the > quantum logic of comp. > > Some hope comes from a paper by Rawling and Selesnick(*), which use > quantum logic, and even the modal logic B, which is the modal form of > quantum logic (by a result due to Goldblatt), to implement a quantum NOR. > All this can be tested in Z1*, and normally we can test the existence of > quantum computation in Z1* (or in his quantified extension qZ1*). Imagine > that someone can prove that qZ1* cannot emulate a quantum computer, and > imagine we succeed in implementing a quantum computation, then comp (+ > Theaetetus) is refuted. > Yesterday (!), I have been sent new papers on quantum logic, which shows > that the field has progressed, notably with respect of quantum computing, > and this suggest that the best way to refute comp, or improve the knowledge > theory, will come from the ability of qS4Grz1, or qZ1*, or qX1*, to > simulate a quantum computer. > > Bruno > > > (*) J. P. Rawling and S. A. Selesnick. Orthologic and Quantum Logic : > Models and Computational > Elements. Journal of the ACM, 47(4) :721–751, 2000. > > > > > > Regards, > Quentin > >> >> >> >> However I see that isn't so, so I will be interested to know how it's >> testable - if I ever make it to understanding AUDA. >> >> >> I hope to be able to explain enough so that you understand the main line >> on this. >> Meanwhile, more explanation, notably in my answer to Brent. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> > > > > -- > All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy > Batty/Rutger Hauer) > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy Batty/Rutger Hauer) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
