On Sunday, February 16, 2014 2:18:54 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote: > > On 16 February 2014 17:48, Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com<javascript:> > > wrote: > > Ah, but then you would be faced with the questions posed by the UDA/MWI >>> arguments, because there would then be two conscious "originals" who >>> claimed equal possession of the same history to that point. That is all you >>> need for the duplication arguments to go through. >>> >> >> They would each be their own originals, not the same original. In >> identical twin is as identical as identical can be. >> > > You are blatantly ignoring the challenge this presents to your contention > that a conscious person cannot be duplicated in principle, by quibbling > over the meaning of copy and original. If Craig were the person duplicated > (whilst asleep, say) and there were then two originals (A and B) each of > whom laid claim to being Craig with the same history, how would you know > whether you were A or B? >
A single cell can be divided into many, but full grown organism can't be cut down the middle longitudinally and grow into two separate bodies. Even as a single cell, mitosis can't be induced by slicing a zygote in half - the motive for reproduction has to come from the inside out. I don't think it will ever be possible to duplicate an organism without growing it from scratch. A cloned brain would have to grow in a vat and would come out as a new born unique individual (who would have comparable similarity to their clone parent as an identical twin separated at birth does). The problem is the assumption that duplication is a possibility in the first place, and that the barrier to duplication depends on complexity alone. What I'm saying is that consciousness is an event, not a structure. You cannot duplicate an event because it is connected to all other events. Craig > David > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
