On 16 Feb 2014, at 22:32, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Sunday, February 16, 2014 2:18:54 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote:
On 16 February 2014 17:48, Craig Weinberg <[email protected]> wrote:
Ah, but then you would be faced with the questions posed by the UDA/
MWI arguments, because there would then be two conscious "originals"
who claimed equal possession of the same history to that point. That
is all you need for the duplication arguments to go through.
They would each be their own originals, not the same original. In
identical twin is as identical as identical can be.
You are blatantly ignoring the challenge this presents to your
contention that a conscious person cannot be duplicated in
principle, by quibbling over the meaning of copy and original. If
Craig were the person duplicated (whilst asleep, say) and there were
then two originals (A and B) each of whom laid claim to being Craig
with the same history, how would you know whether you were A or B?
A single cell can be divided into many, but full grown organism
can't be cut down the middle longitudinally and grow into two
separate bodies. Even as a single cell, mitosis can't be induced by
slicing a zygote in half - the motive for reproduction has to come
from the inside out. I don't think it will ever be possible to
duplicate an organism without growing it from scratch. A cloned
brain would have to grow in a vat and would come out as a new born
unique individual (who would have comparable similarity to their
clone parent as an identical twin separated at birth does). The
problem is the assumption that duplication is a possibility in the
first place, and that the barrier to duplication depends on
complexity alone. What I'm saying is that consciousness is an event,
not a structure. You cannot duplicate an event because it is
connected to all other events.
But again, that is true for the 1p associated to a machine. From its
1p view, it is never duplicated. the doppelganger appears as an
autonomous agent, an other.
Right phenomenology, but invalid inference.
Bruno
Craig
David
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
