On 21 Feb 2014, at 05:36, chris peck wrote:
Hi Bruno
By and large you didn't get my response to Quentin and largely the
comments you made didn't actually address the comments I was making,
or the questions I was asking Quentin. It seems more as if you were
addressing comments you hoped I was making but didn't. With respect
then I've just passed all that stuff by.
Without specific comment, this looks like wordplay.
I thought this was worth commenting on though:
>> So from the FPI, you can infer which "you" notion was involved.
It is asked to the 1-you in Helsinki, coexistencial with the 3-you
in Helsinki. And the question bears on which next 1-you H-you will
feel to be, or equivalently, which city you will feel to be
reconstituted in. The 3-you == 1-you in Helsinki knows that there
will be only one, from his future pov.
No, (3-you == 1-you) knows he has 2 future povs. He knows he will
feel to be in both Washington and Moscow.
He knows that, after pushing the button, he will be in both W and M in
the third person pov.
But he knows about comp, and so he knows that what will actually be
the case, is that in the 3-1 view, he will feel to be unique in W and
he will feel to be unique in M. But those feeling correspond to
incompatible event, and indeed each diary will contain only W or only
M, from both 1-view. As the question bears on those 1-views, the
answer has to be be: "W or M", with an exclusive "or".
How can I make this clear for you that this is a 1-p expectancy?
Because I think you have things completely the wrong way around. You
say that it takes an act of intellectual and 3-p reasoning to draw
the conclusion that I will be in both W and M, and that more
naturally from the 1-p perspective I will only expect to see 1 city.
I say, no. Before the trip to both M and W I will day dream about
walking through the corridors of the white house in Washington AND
day dream about walking through the corridors of the Kremlin in
moscow.
OK, you can do that.
I will imagine meeting and talking to Obama but also dream of
meeting and talking to Putin.
OK. But unless you ignore comp, you will not daydream that you will
meet both Obama and Putin, together.
I'll sit at my work desk planning what I would say to each of them
if we actually did meet. At night I wil dream of doing these things
and wake up surprised that I am not actually in Moscow and not
actually in Washington yet. And these dreams will be as 1-p as any
common-all-garden dream. If I stop and think about things, if I
intellectualize the matter from a 3-p perspective, then I will
realize that my two future selves will be unique and separate and
therefore will only see one or the other, but from my current non-
duplicated perspective this will seem odd and hard to imagine. when
I relax and let my mind wander I will expect to see both and dream
of seeing both.
Not simultaneously. That is the point. Or you are just wrong on
computationalism. If you write "W and M", you can, in Helsinki, know
in advance that both copies will have to admit having been wrong.
So, when you ask me where I will expect to be, of course I will
answer that i expect to be in Moscow and Washington.
So you write "W and M" in the diary. And after pushing the button,
both copies will realize they were wrong, or not answering the
question asked.
It is very simple to see that the prediction "W v M" will be verified
by both copies.
And if you tell me that I will in fact only experience one or the
other, I will demand my money back or at least half of it.
Then if you predict the spin of an electron that we will both see in
some experience that we do together, in the MWI, you should predict
that we will see both. We do the experience, and we see spin up. You
were wrong and if you bet something on this, you lose.
You are just using the pronouns in the ambiguous way of Clark, and
like him, just describe the 3-1 views, instead of the 1-1 views asked.
Best,
Bruno
All the best
Chris.
From: [email protected]
To: [email protected]
Subject: RE: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
Date: Fri, 21 Feb 2014 03:48:43 +0000
Hi Liz
>>Suppose for the sake of argument that the matter transmitter sends
you to another solar system where you will live out the reminder of
your life. Maybe you committed some crime and this is the
consequence, to be "transported" :) A malfunction causes you to be
duplicated and sent to both destinations, but you will never meet
your doppelganger in the other solar system, or find out that he
exists.
Does this make any difference to how you assign probabilities? If
so, why?
My probabilities get assigned in the same way. ie: chance of seeing
solar system A is 1. I can't assign a probability of seeing Solar
System B if I don't know about the possibility of accidents. But,
If I know that there is a small chance of the accident you describe
then the probabilities end up:
Solar System A : 1
Solar System B : small chance.
Note that the probability of seeing Solar System A doesn't end up (1-
small chance) as far as I am concerned.
Also note that in the MWI example, where small chances require a
world of their own, the probabilities end up:
Solar System A : 1
Solar System B : 1.
So the probabilities work out slightly differently. I'm sure its an
unpopular view but as I see it probabilities, however small, get
rounded up to 1 in MWI scenarios.
All the best
Chris.
From: [email protected]
To: [email protected]
Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
Date: Thu, 20 Feb 2014 20:45:39 +0100
On 20 Feb 2014, at 16:59, John Clark wrote:
On Wed, Feb 19, 2014 at 2:47 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
wrote:
> I can say today that I am the guy having answered your post of
last week.
But if duplicating chambers exist then there are lots of people who
could say exactly the same thing, so more specificity is needed.
Well, if it is about a prediction on 1p events, the specificity is
simple: we have to interview all the copies.
>> and neither is experiencing Helsinki right now, therefore Mr. he
sees neither Washington nor Moscow.
> So, this is my first post to you,
Bruno Marchal has certainly sent other posts to John Clark, but if
duplicating chambers exist it's not at all clear who Mr. my is.
On the contrary. It is always clear. In the 3p we are all copies,
and in the 1p we are one of them.
That is what they all say. They have they own permanent atomic
memories like "WWMWMM". Say.
> despite I remember having sent other post?
The question is ambiguous because lots and lots of people in
addition to Mr. I remember the exact same thing.
Obviously. We agree. But there is no ambiguity. By definition of 1p
and comp, we have to take all the copies 1p view into account. That
is why if the H-guy predicted "W v M", all its copies win the bet,
and if he predicted "W & M", all the copies admits this was wrong
(even if correct for the 3-1 view, but clearly false from their 1-
views).
> If Mr he sees neither W or M, then he died,
If Bruno Marchal wants to invent a new language and that's what the
words "death" and "he" are decreed to mean then fine, but to be
consistent John Clark and Bruno Marchal of yesterday would have to
be dead too. And it should be noted that invented languages make
communication with others difficult, just look at Esperanto, and
John Clark thinks that deep philosophical discussions are difficult
enough as they are even if conducted in a mutually agreed upon
language, so more obstacles to understanding are not needed.
You quote and comment yourself!
> and then comp is false.
That's fine, I don't give a hoot in hell if the incoherent grab bag
of ideas you call "comp" is false or not. The word is your invention
not mine and you're the only one who seems to know exactly what it
means.
You have repeated that sentence an infinity of times. Comp is the
quite standard hypothesis that the brain, or whatever responsible
for my consciousness manifestation here and now, is Turing emulable.
It is not my invention. "comp" abbreviates computationalism. I show
the consequence, and you stop at step 3 for reason that you do not
succeed to communicate.
> We also died each time we measure a spin, or anything.
Then the word "died" doesn't mean much.
That was a consequence of your saying.
> In AUDA this is a confusion
You have forgotten IHA.
I told you more than five times what AUDA means. Stop joking, and
try to be serious. AUDA is the Arithmetical UDA, also called
"interview of the universal machine" in sane04. It is the main part
of the thesis in computer science.
If you doubt that it means that you do repeat hearsay.
> between []p and []p & <>t.
How in the world could anybody be confused between []p and []p & <>t
especially if they had a nice low mileage AUDA convertible to help
them get around town?
Mocking does not help you.
> you believe we have refuted comp. That would be a gigantic discovery
Not to me it wouldn't! I don't care if "comp" is true or false
because I don't believe "comp" is worth a bucket of warm spit.
That contradicts your saying yes to step 0, 1 and 2.
> Pronouns does not introduce any problem,
Personal pronouns like all pronouns are just a sort of shorthand
that were invented to save time and for no other reason, they
generally cause no trouble as long as the referent is clear. And yet
it is a fact that Bruno Marchal is simply incapable of expressing
ideas about the unique nature of personal identity without using
personal pronouns.
I did it, but you are the one caming back with ambiguous pronouns in
your "refutation".
There is no ambiguity at all. Just keep the 1-3 distinction in all
the uses.
Why? Could it be because by using them and the assumption of
uniqueness of identity they engender it makes it much easier to
prove the uniqueness of identity? After all it is well known that
proofs become somewhat easier to write if Bruno Marchal just assumes
what Bruno Marchal is trying to prove. And if ideas are unclear the
language should be too; a bad idea clearly expressed is easy to
identify as bad, but a bad idea expressed in murky language can
sometimes sound impressive if it's murky enough.
Stop doing irrelevant meta-remarks to hide your absence of
arguments. Focus on your point, if there is one, of move top step 4,
if only to get the idea.
> when you agree that after the duplication we are both copies in
the 3p view
Yes. And you once said something abut "the future 1p" of the
Helsinki man, well that description would fit 2 people because both
remember being the Helsinki man.
yes, and that is why the confirmation is asked to the 2 people.
There is nothing ambiguous. "W or M" win, "W & M" lost. Given the
precise question of the 1p views, viewed from the 1p-views, and not
on the 3-1 views.
It is quasi primary school level.
> and only one of them, in the 1p view.
Only one? So which one is the phony, the Washington Man or the
Moscow Man?
Both are the phony. No problem as both see indeed only once city.
That was a correct prediction by the H-guy.
> I am happy you think it is a world class discovery, but let us be
modest, it is a reminder that the mind-body problem is not solved,
and that "science" has not decided between Aristotle and Plato. The
discovery (the thesis) is in the math part
I too have discovered a new sort of indeterminacy that involves math
and it is very very similar to the sort you discovered; I add 2 to
the number 3 and I add 8 to the number 3. The number 3 can't predict
if it will end up as a 5 or as a 11. I believe my discovery is just
as profound as yours. Not very.
So you accept that step 3 is a discovery? Nice. But to judge the
result, you have to move to step 4.
Bruno
John K Clark
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