Hi Bruno By and large you didn't get my response to Quentin and largely the comments you made didn't actually address the comments I was making, or the questions I was asking Quentin. It seems more as if you were addressing comments you hoped I was making but didn't. With respect then I've just passed all that stuff by.
I thought this was worth commenting on though: >> So from the FPI, you can infer which "you" notion was involved. It is asked >> to the 1-you in Helsinki, coexistencial with the 3-you in Helsinki. And the >> question bears on which next 1-you H-you will feel to be, or equivalently, >> which city you will feel to be reconstituted in. The 3-you == 1-you in >> Helsinki knows that there will be only one, from his future pov. No, (3-you == 1-you) knows he has 2 future povs. He knows he will feel to be in both Washington and Moscow. How can I make this clear for you that this is a 1-p expectancy? Because I think you have things completely the wrong way around. You say that it takes an act of intellectual and 3-p reasoning to draw the conclusion that I will be in both W and M, and that more naturally from the 1-p perspective I will only expect to see 1 city. I say, no. Before the trip to both M and W I will day dream about walking through the corridors of the white house in Washington AND day dream about walking through the corridors of the Kremlin in moscow. I will imagine meeting and talking to Obama but also dream of meeting and talking to Putin. I'll sit at my work desk planning what I would say to each of them if we actually did meet. At night I wil dream of doing these things and wake up surprised that I am not actually in Moscow and not actually in Washington yet. And these dreams will be as 1-p as any common-all-garden dream. If I stop and think about things, if I intellectualize the matter from a 3-p perspective, then I will realize that my two future selves will be unique and separate and therefore will only see one or the other, but from my current non-duplicated perspective this will seem odd and hard to imagine. when I relax and let my mind wander I will expect to see both and dream of seeing both. So, when you ask me where I will expect to be, of course I will answer that i expect to be in Moscow and Washington. And if you tell me that I will in fact only experience one or the other, I will demand my money back or at least half of it. All the best Chris. From: chris_peck...@hotmail.com To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: RE: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room) Date: Fri, 21 Feb 2014 03:48:43 +0000 Hi Liz >>Suppose for the sake of argument that the matter transmitter sends you to another solar system where you will live out the reminder of your life. Maybe you committed some crime and this is the consequence, to be "transported" :) A malfunction causes you to be duplicated and sent to both destinations, but you will never meet your doppelganger in the other solar system, or find out that he exists. Does this make any difference to how you assign probabilities? If so, why? My probabilities get assigned in the same way. ie: chance of seeing solar system A is 1. I can't assign a probability of seeing Solar System B if I don't know about the possibility of accidents. But, If I know that there is a small chance of the accident you describe then the probabilities end up: Solar System A : 1 Solar System B : small chance. Note that the probability of seeing Solar System A doesn't end up (1-small chance) as far as I am concerned. Also note that in the MWI example, where small chances require a world of their own, the probabilities end up: Solar System A : 1 Solar System B : 1. So the probabilities work out slightly differently. I'm sure its an unpopular view but as I see it probabilities, however small, get rounded up to 1 in MWI scenarios. All the best Chris. From: marc...@ulb.ac.be To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room) Date: Thu, 20 Feb 2014 20:45:39 +0100 On 20 Feb 2014, at 16:59, John Clark wrote:On Wed, Feb 19, 2014 at 2:47 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > I can say today that I am the guy having answered your post of last week. But if duplicating chambers exist then there are lots of people who could say exactly the same thing, so more specificity is needed. Well, if it is about a prediction on 1p events, the specificity is simple: we have to interview all the copies. >> and neither is experiencing Helsinki right now, therefore Mr. he sees >> neither Washington nor Moscow. > So, this is my first post to you, Bruno Marchal has certainly sent other posts to John Clark, but if duplicating chambers exist it's not at all clear who Mr. my is. On the contrary. It is always clear. In the 3p we are all copies, and in the 1p we are one of them.That is what they all say. They have they own permanent atomic memories like "WWMWMM". Say. > despite I remember having sent other post? The question is ambiguous because lots and lots of people in addition to Mr. I remember the exact same thing. Obviously. We agree. But there is no ambiguity. By definition of 1p and comp, we have to take all the copies 1p view into account. That is why if the H-guy predicted "W v M", all its copies win the bet, and if he predicted "W & M", all the copies admits this was wrong (even if correct for the 3-1 view, but clearly false from their 1-views). > If Mr he sees neither W or M, then he died, If Bruno Marchal wants to invent a new language and that's what the words "death" and "he" are decreed to mean then fine, but to be consistent John Clark and Bruno Marchal of yesterday would have to be dead too. And it should be noted that invented languages make communication with others difficult, just look at Esperanto, and John Clark thinks that deep philosophical discussions are difficult enough as they are even if conducted in a mutually agreed upon language, so more obstacles to understanding are not needed. You quote and comment yourself! > and then comp is false. That's fine, I don't give a hoot in hell if the incoherent grab bag of ideas you call "comp" is false or not. The word is your invention not mine and you're the only one who seems to know exactly what it means. You have repeated that sentence an infinity of times. Comp is the quite standard hypothesis that the brain, or whatever responsible for my consciousness manifestation here and now, is Turing emulable.It is not my invention. "comp" abbreviates computationalism. I show the consequence, and you stop at step 3 for reason that you do not succeed to communicate. > We also died each time we measure a spin, or anything. Then the word "died" doesn't mean much. That was a consequence of your saying. > In AUDA this is a confusion You have forgotten IHA. I told you more than five times what AUDA means. Stop joking, and try to be serious. AUDA is the Arithmetical UDA, also called "interview of the universal machine" in sane04. It is the main part of the thesis in computer science.If you doubt that it means that you do repeat hearsay. > between []p and []p & <>t. How in the world could anybody be confused between []p and []p & <>t especially if they had a nice low mileage AUDA convertible to help them get around town? Mocking does not help you. > you believe we have refuted comp. That would be a gigantic discovery Not to me it wouldn't! I don't care if "comp" is true or false because I don't believe "comp" is worth a bucket of warm spit. That contradicts your saying yes to step 0, 1 and 2. > Pronouns does not introduce any problem, Personal pronouns like all pronouns are just a sort of shorthand that were invented to save time and for no other reason, they generally cause no trouble as long as the referent is clear. And yet it is a fact that Bruno Marchal is simply incapable of expressing ideas about the unique nature of personal identity without using personal pronouns. I did it, but you are the one caming back with ambiguous pronouns in your "refutation". There is no ambiguity at all. Just keep the 1-3 distinction in all the uses. Why? Could it be because by using them and the assumption of uniqueness of identity they engender it makes it much easier to prove the uniqueness of identity? After all it is well known that proofs become somewhat easier to write if Bruno Marchal just assumes what Bruno Marchal is trying to prove. And if ideas are unclear the language should be too; a bad idea clearly expressed is easy to identify as bad, but a bad idea expressed in murky language can sometimes sound impressive if it's murky enough. Stop doing irrelevant meta-remarks to hide your absence of arguments. Focus on your point, if there is one, of move top step 4, if only to get the idea. > when you agree that after the duplication we are both copies in the 3p view Yes. And you once said something abut "the future 1p" of the Helsinki man, well that description would fit 2 people because both remember being the Helsinki man. yes, and that is why the confirmation is asked to the 2 people. There is nothing ambiguous. "W or M" win, "W & M" lost. Given the precise question of the 1p views, viewed from the 1p-views, and not on the 3-1 views. It is quasi primary school level. > and only one of them, in the 1p view. Only one? So which one is the phony, the Washington Man or the Moscow Man? Both are the phony. No problem as both see indeed only once city. That was a correct prediction by the H-guy. > I am happy you think it is a world class discovery, but let us be modest, it > is a reminder that the mind-body problem is not solved, and that "science" > has not decided between Aristotle and Plato. The discovery (the thesis) is > in the math part I too have discovered a new sort of indeterminacy that involves math and it is very very similar to the sort you discovered; I add 2 to the number 3 and I add 8 to the number 3. The number 3 can't predict if it will end up as a 5 or as a 11. I believe my discovery is just as profound as yours. Not very. So you accept that step 3 is a discovery? Nice. But to judge the result, you have to move to step 4. Bruno John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. 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