On 24 Feb 2014, at 14:57, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
Thanks Bruno...
As an advocate of a computational reality, I certainly believe that
part of that universe (subsets) is computational minds, though I
suspect we'd disagree about most of the rest....
You are welcome, but may be David meant some nuances. The problem is
that many "definition" of CTM are done in the frame of the
Aristotelian idea that there is a primitive physical universe, which,
actually is not sensical with mechanism, comp or CTM "well understood".
Bruno
Edgar
On Monday, February 24, 2014 8:53:37 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 24 Feb 2014, at 14:16, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
Pardon me but what does CTM stand for?
It is Computationalist Theory of Mind. It is another name of
computationalism or comp, although usually comp refers explicitly to
the very weak (logically) version of it.
Usually CTM assumes that the brain is the "organ of consciousness'
and that neurons are the main items handling information, but comp
assumes only a level of digital substitution, which can be as low as
we want, and works for a general notion of brains, which can any
portion of the physical universe we would have to copy to have the
consciousness invariance. Comp can have a level so low that we might
need the copy of the whole universe, at the level of strings
described with 10^(10^10) decimals, for example (and that is usually
not allowed implicitly in common forms of CTM).
So, if you want COMP -> CTM.
I am not sure why David switched the term. Perhaps to avoid the
confusion between comp and its assumptions (like John Clark does
sometimes), or perhaps just to allude to the fact that it is a
common theory used by most cognitive scientists.
Bruno
Edgar
On Sunday, February 23, 2014 9:55:27 AM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote:
This might be a more concise way of making my argument:
It is my claim that CTM has overlooked the necessity to describe
the method, mechanism, or arithmetic principle by which
computations are encountered.
My hypothesis, drawn from both direct human experience as well as
experience with technological devices, is that "everything which is
counted must first be encountered". Extending this dictum, I
propose that
1. There is nothing at all which cannot be reduced to an encounter,
and
2. That the nature of encounters can be described as aesthetic re-
acquaintance, nested sensory-motive participation, or simply sense.
3. In consideration of 1, sense is understood in all cases to be
pre-mechanical, pre-arithmetic, and inescapably fundamental.
My challenge then, is for CTM to provide a functional account of
how numbers encounter each other, and how they came to be separated
from the whole of arithmetic truth in the first place. We know that
an actual machine must encounter data through physical input to a
hardware substrate, but how does an ideal machine encounter data?
How does it insulate itself from data which is not relevant to the
machine?
Failing a satisfactory explanation of the fundamental mechanism
behind computation, I conclude that:
4. The logic which compels us to seek a computational or mechanical
theory of mind is rooted in an expectation of functional necessity.
5. This logic is directly contradicted by the absence of critical
inquiry to the mechanisms which provide arithmetic function.
6. CTM should be understood to be compromised by petito principii
fallacy, as it begs its own question by feigning to explain macro
level mental phenomena through brute inflation of its own micro
level mental phenomena which is overlooked entirely within CTM.
7. In consideration of 1-6, it must be seen that CTM is invalid,
and should possibly be replaced by an approach which addresses the
fallacy directly.
8. PIP (Primordial Identity Pansensitivity) offers a trans-
theoretical explanation in which the capacity for sense encounters
is the sole axiom.
9. CTM can be rehabilitated, and all of its mathematical science
can be redeemed by translating into PIP terms, which amounts to
reversing the foundations of number theory so that they are sense-
subordinate.
10. This effectively renders CTM a theory of mind-like simulation,
rather than macro level minds, however, mind-simulation proceeds
from PIP as a perfectly viable cosmological inquiry, albeit from an
impersonal, theoretical platform of sense.
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