On 24 Feb 2014, at 15:38, David Nyman wrote:
On 24 February 2014 13:53, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
I am not sure why David switched the term. Perhaps to avoid the
confusion between comp and its assumptions (like John Clark does
sometimes), or perhaps just to allude to the fact that it is a
common theory used by most cognitive scientists.
All of the above. My working assumption is that CTM, as an implicit
posit of many theories (not merely those of cognitive scientists),
?
What is CTM?
In a sense comp is very weak (= very general, assume less), it assumes
no bound for the level and the scope of the digital substitution, but
it is strong in making explicit a bet on consciousness invariance (the
"theological aspect" , the belief in a form of technological
reincarnation).
directly entails the logically weaker formulation based on digital
substitution that,
? This is confusing. If it entails something, that something is
stronger.
Comp assumes less, but is still strong in itself. As it assumes CT
(although it is formally dispensable), and it assumes the brain
replacement.
I am no more sure what you mean by CTM. If M is for mind, then it is
comp. If M is for matter, then it is (very plausibly up to vocabulary
plays) inconsistent with comp.
Some people believe in notion of computation not related to Church
thesis, but none succeed to define them properly, or there are
different notion than computation, like provability, and their
opposition to Church thesis is a confusion of level. So if CTM is
"computational theory of mind" , it means that it is computationalism
(taking into account the consequences or not).
In that sense CTM -> comp (but some will disagree, as CT is not so
well understood, I think).
Usually, computational theory of mind still divide on representational
theory, and non representational theories, comp is a priori neutral,
but any choice of substitution level, entails a representation level,
AUDA is partially representational, []p is representational, but []p &
p is not.
notably, does not presuppose the localisation of mind in a primitive
physical universe.
OK. That is a problem to solve.
Bruno
David
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