On 24 February 2014 16:42, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > > On 24 Feb 2014, at 15:38, David Nyman wrote: > > On 24 February 2014 13:53, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > > I am not sure why David switched the term. Perhaps to avoid the confusion >> between comp and its assumptions (like John Clark does sometimes), or >> perhaps just to allude to the fact that it is a common theory used by most >> cognitive scientists. > > > All of the above. My working assumption is that CTM, as an implicit posit > of many theories (not merely those of cognitive scientists), > > > ? > What is CTM? >
Just what you said it was - the computational theory of mind. I'm agreeing with you. I just meant to say that it's implicitly assumed in much of science and not only by cognitive scientists. I didn't mean to be controversial! > > In a sense comp is very weak (= very general, assume less), it assumes no > bound for the level and the scope of the digital substitution, but it is > strong in making explicit a bet on consciousness invariance (the > "theological aspect" , the belief in a form of technological reincarnation). > Yes. > directly entails the logically weaker formulation based on digital > substitution that, > > > ? This is confusing. If it entails something, that something is stronger. > Sorry, your use of certain terms, as a logician, is much more precise than mine. I probably should have said something more like "leads us to the conclusion that.....etc" instead of "entails". I just meant that I agree with the argument, as presented in the UDA, that the assumption of the invariance of consciousness to digital substitution is incompatible with the localisation of mind in a primitive physical universe. Which, as you say is a formulation of a problem rather than a solution. Sorry for any confusion. David > Comp assumes less, but is still strong in itself. As it assumes CT > (although it is formally dispensable), and it assumes the brain > replacement. > > I am no more sure what you mean by CTM. If M is for mind, then it is comp. > If M is for matter, then it is (very plausibly up to vocabulary plays) > inconsistent with comp. > > Some people believe in notion of computation not related to Church thesis, > but none succeed to define them properly, or there are different notion > than computation, like provability, and their opposition to Church thesis > is a confusion of level. So if CTM is "computational theory of mind" , it > means that it is computationalism (taking into account the consequences or > not). > > In that sense CTM -> comp (but some will disagree, as CT is not so well > understood, I think). > > Usually, computational theory of mind still divide on representational > theory, and non representational theories, comp is a priori neutral, but > any choice of substitution level, entails a representation level, AUDA is > partially representational, []p is representational, but []p & p is not. > > > notably, does not presuppose the localisation of mind in a primitive > physical universe. > > > OK. That is a problem to solve. > > Bruno > > > > > > David > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
