On 24 Feb 2014, at 17:59, David Nyman wrote:
On 24 February 2014 16:42, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
On 24 Feb 2014, at 15:38, David Nyman wrote:
On 24 February 2014 13:53, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
I am not sure why David switched the term. Perhaps to avoid the
confusion between comp and its assumptions (like John Clark does
sometimes), or perhaps just to allude to the fact that it is a
common theory used by most cognitive scientists.
All of the above. My working assumption is that CTM, as an implicit
posit of many theories (not merely those of cognitive scientists),
?
What is CTM?
Just what you said it was - the computational theory of mind. I'm
agreeing with you. I just meant to say that it's implicitly assumed
in much of science and not only by cognitive scientists. I didn't
mean to be controversial!
All right!
And of course, no problem being controversial too :)
In a sense comp is very weak (= very general, assume less), it
assumes no bound for the level and the scope of the digital
substitution, but it is strong in making explicit a bet on
consciousness invariance (the "theological aspect" , the belief in a
form of technological reincarnation).
Yes.
OK.
directly entails the logically weaker formulation based on digital
substitution that,
? This is confusing. If it entails something, that something is
stronger.
Sorry, your use of certain terms, as a logician, is much more
precise than mine. I probably should have said something more like
"leads us to the conclusion that.....etc" instead of "entails". I
just meant that I agree with the argument, as presented in the UDA,
that the assumption of the invariance of consciousness to digital
substitution is incompatible with the localisation of mind in a
primitive physical universe. Which, as you say is a formulation of a
problem rather than a solution.
Sorry for any confusion.
No problem.
Bruno
PS sorry for the delay, heavy busy period. My p-time get stuck in
that interminable 24 february, I think there is a black hole in the
basement oh ... oh ... ... oh ..................
oh .......................... :-)
David
Comp assumes less, but is still strong in itself. As it assumes CT
(although it is formally dispensable), and it assumes the brain
replacement.
I am no more sure what you mean by CTM. If M is for mind, then it is
comp. If M is for matter, then it is (very plausibly up to
vocabulary plays) inconsistent with comp.
Some people believe in notion of computation not related to Church
thesis, but none succeed to define them properly, or there are
different notion than computation, like provability, and their
opposition to Church thesis is a confusion of level. So if CTM is
"computational theory of mind" , it means that it is
computationalism (taking into account the consequences or not).
In that sense CTM -> comp (but some will disagree, as CT is not so
well understood, I think).
Usually, computational theory of mind still divide on
representational theory, and non representational theories, comp is
a priori neutral, but any choice of substitution level, entails a
representation level, AUDA is partially representational, []p is
representational, but []p & p is not.
notably, does not presuppose the localisation of mind in a
primitive physical universe.
OK. That is a problem to solve.
Bruno
David
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