Craig, I agree too. Makes it sound low brow and pop culturish, like some consumer product for housewives. But that's a good way to distinguish it from my computational reality. :-)
Edgar On Monday, February 24, 2014 8:58:19 AM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > On Monday, February 24, 2014 8:16:00 AM UTC-5, Edgar L. Owen wrote: >> >> Craig, >> >> Pardon me but what does CTM stand for? >> > > Computational Theory of Mind. > > Someone mentioned that they are tired of the word 'Comp', and I agree. > Something about it I never liked. Makes it sound friendly and natural, when > I suspect that is neither. > > Craig > > >> >> Edgar >> >> >> On Sunday, February 23, 2014 9:55:27 AM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote: >>> >>> This might be a more concise way of making my argument: >>> >>> It is my claim that CTM has overlooked the necessity to describe the >>> method, mechanism, or arithmetic principle by which computations are >>> encountered. >>> >>> My hypothesis, drawn from both direct human experience as well as >>> experience with technological devices, is that "everything which is counted >>> must first be encountered". Extending this dictum, I propose that >>> >>> 1. There is nothing at all which cannot be reduced to an encounter, and >>> 2. That the nature of encounters can be described as aesthetic >>> re-acquaintance, nested sensory-motive participation, or simply sense. >>> 3. In consideration of 1, sense is understood in all cases to be >>> pre-mechanical, pre-arithmetic, and inescapably fundamental. >>> >>> My challenge then, is for CTM to provide a functional account of how >>> numbers encounter each other, and how they came to be separated from the >>> whole of arithmetic truth in the first place. We know that an actual >>> machine must encounter data through physical input to a hardware substrate, >>> but how does an ideal machine encounter data? How does it insulate itself >>> from data which is not relevant to the machine? >>> >>> Failing a satisfactory explanation of the fundamental mechanism behind >>> computation, I conclude that: >>> >>> 4. The logic which compels us to seek a computational or mechanical >>> theory of mind is rooted in an expectation of functional necessity. >>> 5. This logic is directly contradicted by the absence of critical >>> inquiry to the mechanisms which provide arithmetic function. >>> 6. CTM should be understood to be compromised by petito principii >>> fallacy, as it begs its own question by feigning to explain macro level >>> mental phenomena through brute inflation of its own micro level mental >>> phenomena which is overlooked entirely within CTM. >>> 7. In consideration of 1-6, it must be seen that CTM is invalid, and >>> should possibly be replaced by an approach which addresses the fallacy >>> directly. >>> 8. PIP (Primordial Identity Pansensitivity) offers a trans-theoretical >>> explanation in which the capacity for sense encounters is the sole axiom. >>> 9. CTM can be rehabilitated, and all of its mathematical science can be >>> redeemed by translating into PIP terms, which amounts to reversing the >>> foundations of number theory so that they are sense-subordinate. >>> 10. This effectively renders CTM a theory of mind-like simulation, >>> rather than macro level minds, however, mind-simulation proceeds from PIP >>> as a perfectly viable cosmological inquiry, albeit from an impersonal, >>> theoretical platform of sense. >>> >> -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
